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UNLOCKING THE FIFTH AMENDMENT:  
PASSWORDS AND ENCRYPTED DEVICES 
Laurent Sacharoff* 
 
Each year, law enforcement seizes thousands of electronic devices—
smartphones, laptops, and notebooks—that it cannot open without the 
suspect’s password.  Without this password, the information on the device 
sits completely scrambled behind a wall of encryption.  Sometimes agents 
will be able to obtain the information by hacking, discovering copies of data 
on the cloud, or obtaining the password voluntarily from the suspects 
themselves.  But when they cannot, may the government compel suspects to 
disclose or enter their password? 
This Article considers the Fifth Amendment protection against compelled 
disclosures of passwords—a question that has split and confused courts.  It 
measures this right against the legal right of law enforcement, armed with a 
warrant, to search the device that it has validly seized.  Encryption cases 
present the unique hybrid scenario that link and entangle the Fourth and 
Fifth Amendments.  In a sense, this Article explores whose rights should 
prevail. 
This Article proposes a novel settlement that draws upon the best aspects 
of Fourth and Fifth Amendment law:  the government can compel a suspect 
to decrypt only those files it already knows she possesses.  This rule follows 
from existing Fifth Amendment case law and, as a corollary to the 
fundamental nature of strong encryption, also represents the best 
accommodation of law enforcement needs against individual privacy. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The U.S. Supreme Court has long pondered how the Fourth and Fifth 
Amendments relate during a criminal investigation.  Under the hoary, 
nineteenth century Boyd doctrine, the Court once intertwined the two 
amendments into a majestic, overlapping bulwark of absolute protection.1  
For example, the government could not compel a suspect to produce personal 
papers as evidence in a criminal case.  Indeed, at its apogee, the amendments 
together barred agents from physically seizing such papers or other 
evidence—even with a warrant.2 
 
 1. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886), overruled by Fisher v. United States, 425 
U.S. 391 (1976). 
 2. Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298, 309 (1921) (holding that search warrants “may 
not be used as a means of gaining access to a man’s house or office and papers solely for the 
purpose of making search to secure evidence to be used against him in a criminal or penal 
proceeding”), overruled by Warden, Md. Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967). 
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In the last fifty years, however, the Court has sought to melt this powerful 
alloy, separating each amendment into complementary, distinct domains.  
When the government compels a person to testify, the Fifth Amendment 
applies.3  But when the government unilaterally seizes evidence, only the 
Fourth Amendment governs.4  Scholars have similarly sought to define 
separate realms for each.5  As Richard Nagareda put it, the Fifth Amendment 
addresses the “giving” of evidence by a suspect; the Fourth, the “taking” of 
evidence by law enforcement.6 
This new direction has created a gap in coverage, however.  The privacy 
of papers and information fell into this gap, enjoying little to no protection 
from either amendment.  When government officers subpoenaed a person’s 
papers, or when police seized an electronic device with a warrant, they 
enjoyed almost unlimited power in what they could demand and where they 
could search.  Neither amendment imposed meaningful limits. 
This result also followed in part because of the exposed nature of seized 
papers.  Until recently, individuals had little physical power to shield the 
privacy of their personal information.  Once government agents seized 
papers, whether a written journal, a photo album, an email, digital images, or 
a collection of magazines, all were freely visible by their very nature to 
government agents.  The printed word was always in plain view. 
But widespread electronic encryption has altered the balance of power.  
Now individuals can shield their private information.  Most handheld devices 
now automatically “lock,” which means not only that the device will not run, 
but also that the device automatically encrypts its data into an unreadable 
scramble.7  Agents who seize a device with a warrant that authorizes them to 
search its content now find they cannot access those contents without the 
password.  Technology has filled the gap to afford privacy protection to 
papers once again. 
 
 3. United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 10 (1973) (holding that a subpoena requiring a 
person to appear and testify does not implicate the Fourth Amendment seizure provision “once 
the Fifth Amendment is satisfied” (quoting Fraser v. United States, 452 F.2d 616, 620 (7th 
Cir. 1971))). 
 4. Maryland v. Andresen, 427 U.S. 463, 472–73 (1976). 
 5. See generally Robert S. Gerstein, The Demise of Boyd:  Self-Incrimination and 
Private Papers in the Burger Court, 27 UCLA L. REV. 343 (1979); Robert Heidt, The Fifth 
Amendment Privilege and Documents—Cutting Fisher’s Tangled Line, 49 MO. L. REV. 439 
(1984); Richard A. Nagareda, Compulsion “To Be a Witness” and the Resurrection of Boyd, 
74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1575 (1999); H. Richard Uviller, Foreword:  Fisher Goes on the 
Quintessential Fishing Expedition and Hubbell Is Off the Hook, 91 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 311 (2001).  But see generally Bryan H. Choi, For Whom the Data Tolls:  A 
Reunified Theory of Fourth and Fifth Amendment Jurisprudence, 37 CARDOZO L. REV. 185 
(2015); Michael S. Pardo, Disentangling the Fourth Amendment and the Self-Incrimination 
Clause, 90 IOWA L. REV. 1857 (2005). 
 6. Nagareda, supra note 5, at 1603.  Nagareda agrees with the Court that the Fourth and 
Fifth Amendments govern separate domains. Id.  But unlike the Court, he would draw the line 
differently to include the production of documents pursuant to a subpoena under the Fifth 
Amendment “giving” side of the divide. Id. at 1658–59. 
 7.  APPLE, IOS SECURITY 13–16 (2018), https://www.apple.com/business/docs/ 
iOS_Security_Guide.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z5XT-ZFGT]. 
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Indeed, in a development scholars and the courts have largely failed to 
note,8 these facts on the ground by necessity reunite the Fourth and Fifth 
Amendments, making each apply to the same factual situation.  A warrant 
satisfying the Fourth Amendment appears to give the agents the right to all 
the information on the device.  Meanwhile, the Fifth appears to give the 
individual the right to remain silent and thereby deny agents access to that 
same data.  Encryption thus challenges the ability to divide the Fourth and 
Fifth Amendments into discrete territories, and the new technology requires 
a new settlement.  We could set the two amendments against each other or, 
as I propose in this Article, draw upon the values they share to harmonize 
them. 
Consider two paradigmatic scenarios.  First, federal agents suspect an 
individual possesses child pornography, and they obtain a warrant to seize all 
his devices and other storage media.  Agents may recover numerous hard 
drives, flash drives, camera cards, and smartphones; these and other seized 
digital media can sometimes contain terabytes of data.9  But they quickly 
learn the suspect has encrypted the devices with a password they cannot 
crack, and the suspect refuses to disclose it.  In a second scenario, in a drug 
case, agents wish to search the suspect’s smartphone for trophy photos—
images of the suspect standing before drugs, guns, or large amounts of 
money.10  They have arrested the defendant and obtained a warrant to search 
his smartphone, but it is locked and only he has the passcode. 
Law enforcement agencies report thousands of such cases every year—
cases including homicides, drugs cases, child pornography, and white-collar 
crime.11  In these cases, officers have, or can get, a warrant to search a seized 
 
 8. See, e.g., United States v. Apple MacPro Comput., 851 F.3d 238, 248 (3d Cir. 2017) 
(analyzing an order to decrypt a digital device under the Fifth Amendment, with no mention 
of the Fourth); In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated Mar. 25, 2011, 670 F.3d 1335, 
1346 (11th Cir. 2012) (holding that the act of decrypting a hard drive was sufficiently 
testimonial to invoke the Fifth Amendment); see also Dan Terzian, The Fifth Amendment, 
Encryption, and the Forgotten State Interest, 61 UCLA L. REV. DISCOURSE 298, 308 (2014) 
(analyzing decryption as a Fifth Amendment question only, though balancing against law 
enforcement interests within a Fourth Amendment framework).  But see Benjamin 
Folkinshteyn, A Witness Against Himself:  A Case for Stronger Legal Protection of 
Encryption, 30 SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J. 375, 411–12 (2013) (briefly noting that Fifth 
Amendment protections should take account of deficiencies in Fourth Amendment 
protections). 
 9. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated Mar. 25, 2011, 670 F.3d at 
1340 (describing the large volume of data seized in the case, totaling over five terabytes). 
 10. Lucas v. State, 698 A.2d 1145, 1155 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1997) (holding that the trial 
court did not err in admitting trophy photos and expert testimony on their “importance to mid-
level drug dealers”). 
 11. Devlin Barrett, FBI Repeatedly Overstated Encryption Threat Figures to Congress, 
Public, WASH. POST (May 22, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-
security/fbi-repeatedly-overstated-encryption-threat-figures-to-congress-public/2018/05/22/ 
5b68ae90-5dce-11e8-a4a4-c070ef53f315_story.html [https://perma.cc/GQE6-SKND] 
(noting that investigators were locked out of 1000–2000 cellphones last year, and not 7800 as 
the FBI originally stated); N.Y. CTY. DIST. ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, THIRD REPORT OF THE 
MANHATTAN DISTRICT ATTORNEY’S OFFICE ON SMARTPHONE ENCRYPTION AND PUBLIC 
SAFETY 8–9 (2017), https://www.manhattanda.org/wp-content/themes/dany/files/ 
2017%20Report%20of%20the%20Manhattan%20District%20Attorney%27s%20Office%20
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device, but the device is locked.12  Often agents can hack in, but when they 
cannot, they face the fundamental question:  can a court compel a suspect to 
disclose her password or enter it into the device? 
On the one hand, law enforcement and some courts say that the warrant, 
coupled with the Fourth Amendment,13 affords access to the device.14  The 
Fifth Amendment should present no obstacle because the suspect will enter 
the password in such a way that no one sees or learns the password, no one 
records it, and the device itself makes no record of the password.  The 
government has compelled a person merely to turn a key and open a box.  On 
the other hand, many privacy advocates argue that the Fifth Amendment 
provides protection that is far more robust.15  The government cannot compel 
a person to orally disclose her password,16 and requiring her to type it into a 
device amounts to the same prohibited compulsion. 
This Article answers the fundamental question bedeviling courts17 and 
scholars18:  does the Fifth Amendment protect suspects from being 
compelled to enter their passwords into a device? 
This Article charts a sensible middle ground between authorizing law 
enforcement agents to search the entirety of a device and preventing them 
 
on%20Smartphone%20Encryption.pdf [https://perma.cc/5NL5-J6DN] (stating that the 
Manhattan District Attorney’s Office recovered 1283 locked devices in 2017). 
 12. See supra note 11.  The Manhattan report elsewhere suggests that law enforcement 
ultimately unlocked most of these devices through hacking. N.Y. CTY. DIST. ATTORNEY’S 
OFFICE, supra note 11, at 8. 
 13. Federal and state statutes and rules authorize courts to issue search warrants, and the 
Fourth Amendment merely provides limits on their use and on searches without warrants. See, 
e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 41; see also United States v. Horton, 863 F.3d 1041, 1049 (8th Cir. 2017) 
(holding that a warrant issued beyond the authorization of Rule 41 is no warrant at all). 
 14. See Rod J. Rosenstein, Deputy Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Remarks as 
Prepared for Delivery at the United States Naval Academy (Oct. 10, 2017), 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/deputy-attorney-general-rod-j-rosenstein-delivers-
remarks-encryption-united-states-naval [https://perma.cc/2GU9-9T4A] (noting that if law 
enforcement meets the Fourth Amendment’s warrant and probable cause requirements, agents 
can access locked devices used to commit crimes); see also Microsoft Corp. v. United States, 
829 F.3d 197, 223–24 (2d Cir. 2016) (Lynch, J., concurring) (stating that the Fourth 
Amendment’s probable cause requirement provides sufficient protection to individual 
privacy), vacated, 138 S. Ct. 1186 (2018). 
 15. See, e.g., Jamie Williams, EFF to Court:  Forcing Someone to Unlock and Decrypt 
Their Phone Violates the Constitution, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. (Mar. 6, 2017), 
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2017/03/eff-court-forcing-someone-unlock-and-decrypt-their-
phone-violates-constitution [https://perma.cc/F5F4-M2L6]. 
 16. See, e.g., United States v. Kirschner, 823 F. Supp. 2d 665, 669 (E.D. Mich. 2010); see 
also United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 43 (2000) (holding that an act is “testimonial” if 
it is “like telling an inquisitor the combination to a wall safe, not like being forced to surrender 
the key to a strongbox”). 
 17. Compare In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated Mar. 25, 2011, 670 F.3d 
1335, 1341 (11th Cir. 2012) (finding that the Fifth Amendment protects against compelled 
disclosure of passwords), with United States v. Apple MacPro Comput., 851 F.3d 238, 248 
(3d Cir. 2017) (finding no Fifth Amendment protection on the facts before it), and 
Commonwealth v. Gelfgatt, 11 N.E.3d 605, 615 (Mass. 2014) (same). 
 18. See Aloni Cohen & Sunoo Park, Compelled Decryption and the Fifth Amendment:  
Exploring the Technical Boundaries, 32 HARV. J.L. & TECH. (forthcoming 2019) (applying 
the technical lessons of cryptography to Fifth Amendment case law but remaining largely 
neutral on the central legal debates). 
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from obtaining any information from a locked device whatsoever.  This 
Article proposes that a court may compel a suspect to decrypt only those files 
that (1) the government already knows the person possesses, and (2) the 
government can describe with reasonable particularity.  Once the government 
has identified the specific files, it may compel the defendant to decrypt only 
those files.  It may not, as often happens today, require him to enter his 
password and walk away,19 a requirement that affords law enforcement 
access to all of his files simply upon satisfying the rule of particularity for 
one or two files. 
I derive this rule of particularity from the best principles of both the Fourth 
and Fifth Amendments.  It draws upon the particularity requirement in the 
Fourth Amendment’s Warrant Clause and existing Fifth Amendment case 
law—well outside the password and encryption context—on the act-of-
production doctrine and its complement the foregone conclusion test. 
This rule not only balances the Fourth and Fifth Amendments but 
harmonizes them.  Under the Fifth Amendment, my rule limits the assistance 
the government can compel from a defendant in her own prosecution by 
requiring her to make her entire digital life available.  Moreover, my rule 
promotes another Fifth Amendment value:  a limit on government fishing 
expeditions.20  By limiting the government to only those files it can identify, 
this rule prevents law enforcement agents from reviewing thousands of files 
in search of new crimes. 
Under the Fourth Amendment, my rule of particularity enhances 
informational privacy21 and limits broad government overreach, such as 
exploratory searches for new crimes.22  It also provides suspects the very 
security the Fourth Amendment expressly protects by making clear to them 
the precise files the government will inspect—a value carefully enunciated 
in the precedent leading to the Fourth Amendment.  It assures suspects that 
government agents will not roam at will throughout the entirety of the 
person’s digital life. 
This Article argues that we must view Fifth Amendment rights against the 
background of the existing Fourth Amendment deficiencies—we cannot 
simply view each in isolation.  Instead, we must begin again to read the two 
 
 19. See, e.g., Gelfgatt, 11 N.E.3d at 611. 
 20. See infra notes 270–81 and accompanying text. 
 21. See generally Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967); Eric Schnapper, 
Unreasonable Searches and Seizures of Papers, 71 VA. L. REV. 869, 873 (1985) (arguing that 
the Fourth Amendment historically afforded nearly absolute protection for private papers in 
criminal investigations). 
 22. See Schnapper, supra note 21, at 918.  Current Fourth Amendment case law essentially 
allows agents, armed with a warrant, to search every file, folder, picture, video, spreadsheet, 
message, and document for evidence of the crime that gave rise to probable cause. See, e.g., 
United States v. Evers, 669 F.3d 645, 653 (6th Cir. 2012); United States v. Burgess, 576 F.3d 
1078, 1094 (10th Cir. 2009) (“[T]here may be no practical substitute for actually looking in 
many (perhaps all) folders and sometimes at the documents contained within those folders.”); 
see also Adam Gershowitz, The Post-Riley Search Warrant:  Search Protocols and 
Particularity in Cell Phone Searches, 69 VAND. L. REV. 585, 615 (2016) (noting and critiquing 
the lack of ex ante limits on search warrant execution). 
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amendments together.  After all, Boyd did not say we should blindly conflate 
them, but rather that they “throw great light on each other.”23 
Current case law and scholarship concerning compelled decryption have 
not only focused too narrowly on technical Fifth Amendment considerations, 
such as the foregone conclusion doctrine, but have also misconstrued that 
doctrine in ways that threaten to unravel its entire framework.  As I discuss 
in depth below,24 cases have mistakenly applied the foregone conclusion 
doctrine to the password rather than to the documents sought. 
This Article falls within the larger debate concerning encryption.25  On the 
one hand, many in law enforcement have complained that encryption 
facilitates crime and stymies investigations.  Former FBI Director James 
Comey and many others in law enforcement have painted a dark picture of 
terrorists communicating and operating at will, in secret.26  On the other 
hand, law enforcement can obtain the information despite encryption in most 
situations.27  In these instances, the suspect may volunteer the password or 
open the device,28 law enforcement may obtain data synced to a cloud from 
a service provider,29 a spouse or family member may provide access, law 
enforcement may learn the password from other easily available sources, or 
law enforcement may crack the device by brute force.30 
This Article addresses those cases in which law enforcement cannot gain 
access without the password, and the suspect or witness refuses to disclose 
 
 23. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 633 (1886). 
 24. See infra Part IV.D. 
 25. See generally NAT’L ACAD. OF SCI., DECRYPTING THE ENCRYPTION DEBATE:  A 
FRAMEWORK FOR DECISION MAKERS (2018). 
 26. See generally Encryption Working Group Year-End Report, HOUSE JUDICIARY COMM. 
& HOUSE ENERGY & COM. COMM. (Dec. 20, 2016), https://judiciary.house.gov/wp-
content/uploads/2016/12/20161220EWGFINALReport.pdf [https://perma.cc/WUN3-
Q6BN]; HOUSE HOMELAND SEC. COMM. MAJORITY STAFF REPORT, GOING DARK, GOING 
FORWARD:  A PRIMER ON THE ENCRYPTION DEBATE (2016), https://homeland.house.gov/wp-
content/uploads/2016/07/Staff-Report-Going-Dark-Going-Forward.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/8JWD-F6L3]; Rosenstein, supra note 14 (“Encrypted communications that 
cannot be intercepted and locked devices that cannot be opened are law-free zones that permit 
criminals and terrorists to operate without detection.”). 
 27. See generally Orin S. Kerr & Bruce Schneier, Encryption Workarounds, 106 GEO. 
L.J. 989 (2018); BERKMAN CTR. FOR INTERNET & SOC’Y HARVARD UNIV., DON’T PANIC:  
MAKING PROGRESS ON THE “GOING DARK” DEBATE (2016), https://cyber.harvard.edu/ 
pubrelease/dont-panic/Dont_Panic_Making_Progress_on_Going_Dark_Debate.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/JN6U-AKYK] (cataloging methods available to law enforcement to sidestep 
encryption). 
 28. Suspects in child pornography cases often simply confess to the possession of the 
information and disclose their passwords, perhaps out of deep shame. See, e.g., United States 
v. Johnson, 652 F.3d 918, 920 (8th Cir. 2011) (describing how the suspect, after receiving 
Miranda warnings, admitted to authorities that he saved any child pornography he “stumbled 
upon”). 
 29. 18 U.S.C. § 2703 (2012) (stating that electronic service providers must produce their 
customers’ emails and other communications in response to appropriate legal process); FED. 
R. CRIM. P. 41(e)(2)(A)–(B). 
 30. Brute force access often involves trying numerous keys or passwords. See Kerr & 
Schneier, supra note 27, at 994; see also N.Y. CTY. DIST. ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, supra note 11, 
at 8 (stating that workarounds may involve “exploit[ing] a flaw in the encryption scheme”). 
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it.  These circumstances are likely to increase as encryption becomes a 
greater, more automatic part of our data lives.31  Each year, major cities seize 
hundreds of encrypted devices they cannot decrypt, primarily investigating 
ordinary (nonterrorism) crimes such as narcotics, cybercrime, homicide, and 
sex crimes.  The Manhattan District Attorney’s Office reports that it seized 
1283 locked devices in 2017, and other jurisdictions report similar 
numbers.32 
So far, most reported court cases involve contraband images or other 
evidence on devices, and this Article therefore focuses on these cases.  But 
this simple, paradigmatic case will apply directly to the range of encryption 
problems law enforcement will increasingly face, including encrypted cloud 
storage,33 encrypted cloud computing,34 encrypted communications, and 
more novel applications of passwords and encryption such as Bitcoin or other 
digital currency35 and smart contract rights on blockchains.36 
Part I summarizes the Court’s changing treatment of the Fourth and Fifth 
Amendment protections for papers and, as applied today, digital evidence.  It 
elaborates upon the Fifth Amendment act-of-production doctrine, and shows 
how the foregone conclusion doctrine leads to a suitable rule for passwords.  
Part II summarizes how encryption works to lock devices and scramble their 
contents.  Part III considers the different ways law enforcement might compel 
a password, focusing in particular on two main categories:  compelling a 
suspect to state her password or compelling her to enter it directly into her 
device.  It concludes that the first category represents Fifth Amendment 
protected testimony, whereas the second category amounts to the quasi 
testimony protected by the act-of-production doctrine.  Part IV applies the 
act-of-production doctrine and the foregone conclusion test to the 
paradigmatic case:  a seized device that contains contraband images or other 
evidence.  Finally, Part V considers both the Fourth and Fifth Amendments 
from a theoretical perspective and describes how a particularity rule furthers 
the goals of both amendments. 
 
 31. See N.Y. CTY. DIST. ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, supra note 11, at 2 (noting that the “arms 
race” between strong commercial encryption and law enforcement’s power to crack it has 
“intensified”).  These authorities often do not clarify, however, how many of these devices 
they ultimately cannot decrypt.  In fact, the FBI significantly inflated the number to nearly 
7800 until May 2018, when it conceded the annual number was closer to 1200. Barrett, supra 
note 11. 
 32. N.Y. CTY. DIST. ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, supra note 11, at 5. 
 33. See Wei Chen Lin, Where Are Your Papers?:  The Fourth Amendment, the Stored 
Communications Act, the Third-Party Doctrine, the Cloud, and Encryption, 65 DEPAUL L. 
REV. 1093, 1096 (2016) (noting that the market may well soon facilitate widespread 
encryption of cloud storage). 
 34. See STEFAN RASS & DANIEL SLAMANIG, CRYPTOGRAPHY FOR SECURITY AND PRIVACY 
IN CLOUD COMPUTING 1–2 (2014). 
 35. See ANDREAS M. ANTONOPOULOS, MASTERING BITCOIN:  UNLOCKING DIGITAL 
CRYPTOCURRENCIES 97 (2014) (describing the use of cryptographic private keys for digital 
currency wallets). 
 36. See generally Ethereum Blockchain App Platform, ETHEREUM, 
https://www.ethereum.org [https://perma.cc/J8BR-3YYK] (last visited Aug. 24, 2018) 
(describing the open blockchain, smart contract platform). 
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I.  PAPERS AND CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS 
When scholars and the Court speak of the relationship between the Fourth 
and Fifth Amendments, whether their overlap or the line dividing them, they 
primarily talk about suspects’ papers—their bank statements, letters, 
diaries,37 and, today, their emails, photos, and spreadsheets.  In conducting a 
criminal investigation or prosecuting a criminal case, the government wants 
these documents because they will constitute direct evidence of guilt or lead 
to evidence of guilt. 
Though today we speak of emails, the founding generation similarly 
reverenced the privacy of papers.  The Fourth Amendment lists “papers” 
expressly,38 and its authors relied in large part upon the English court 
precedent39 affording papers nearly absolute protection.40  These cases41 
protected the privacy of papers against government criminal investigations 
for reasons that today we would recognize as sounding in the Fourth and Fifth 
Amendments, as well as the First.42  The court in Entick v. Carrington,43 for 
example, held that the common law did not permit seizing, or subpoenaing 
in discovery, a person’s papers to use them as evidence in a criminal 
investigation.44  This was a question not only of seizure but also of the 
common law principle against self-incrimination. 
The principle derived in part from an abhorrence of government tyranny—
a principle naturally suited to the founding generation.45  But the opinion 
contained a principle amenable to the modern era:  papers taken are not just 
any property or chattel; they are property that contains a person’s secret 
thoughts, and for the government to seize such papers works a greater harm 
than seizing other property.46 
In 1886, the U.S. Supreme Court almost directly applied the common law 
principles of Entick in interpreting and applying the Fourth and Fifth 
 
 37. See, e.g., Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 465–68 (1976) (business records); 
Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886) (“private papers”); Nagareda, supra note 5, 
at 1642. 
 38. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 39. See Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757, 
773 (1994) (stating that the 1763 English Wilkes case “was the paradigm search and seizure 
case for Americans”); David A. Sklansky, The Fourth Amendment and Common Law, 100 
COLUM. L. REV. 1739, 1799 (2000). 
 40. Entick v. Carrington (1765) 19 Howell’s State Trials 1029, 1038–39; Laura K. 
Donohue, The Original Fourth Amendment, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 1181, 1311 (2016) 
(“[In]dividuals’ persons, papers, and effects were immune from government examination and 
interference.”); Schnapper, supra note 21, at 915. 
 41. See generally Entick, 19 Howell’s State Trials 1029; Wilkes v. Wood (1763) 98 Eng. 
Rep. 489; King v. Wilkes, (1763) 95 Eng. Rep. 737. 
 42. See generally Schnapper, supra note 21. 
 43. (1765) 19 Howell’s State Trials 1029. 
 44. See generally id. 
 45. See BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 82–
83 (1992).  See generally WILLIAM J. CUDDIHY, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT:  ORIGINS AND 
ORIGINAL MEANING 602–1791 (2009). 
 46. Entick, 19 Howell’s State Trials at 1066 (“[W]here private papers are removed and 
carried away, the secret nature of those goods will be an aggravation of the trespass.”). 
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Amendments.  In Boyd v. United States,47 the Court read the amendments as 
nearly running together to provide powerful, nearly absolute protection for a 
person’s papers against law enforcement’s efforts to obtain them for criminal 
prosecution.48 
The Boyd holding was premised upon legal principles that would strike the 
modern lawyer as nearly absurd.  First, it held that the search and seizure 
provision protected not only against literal physical seizures of papers but 
also against compelled production such as by a subpoena.49  Merely requiring 
a person to produce the papers himself counted, in the Court’s view, as a 
seizure.  Today, the Fourth Amendment affords only a residue of protection 
against a subpoena—so scant that it is often ignored.50 
Second, the Court held that the production of papers violated the Fourth 
Amendment’s privacy protection for papers.  The Court quoted Entick to 
remind us that papers contain a person’s most private, secret thoughts and 
that they are therefore more sacred than any ordinary property or chattel.51 
Third, it would violate the Fifth Amendment right against self-
incrimination to introduce these papers in court against a criminal defendant.  
The papers in Boyd were business invoices—nothing particularly personal or 
private52—yet the Court afforded even these mundane papers protection.53  
The Court’s principle veered near holding that the Fifth Amendment protects 
a defendant not only against testifying against himself but also from having 
to give or furnish any evidence against himself, even if this meant merely 
surrendering that evidence.54  In the Court’s view, the Fifth Amendment 
protected a person from having to assist in her own undoing.  For much of 
the twentieth century, the Court continued to afford papers nearly absolute 
protection in criminal cases.55 
But in a series of cases in the 1960s, the Court held that the Fourth 
Amendment only applied to subpoenas in a highly watered-down form 
because they are not literally physical seizures;56 rather, they are orders that 
the suspect or defendant produce the documents themselves.  The once-
sacred privacy represented by a person’s papers now yielded immediately to 
the needs of government investigations.  For our purposes, in compelling a 
password, the Fourth Amendment would therefore impose no meaningful 
limits under these cases. 
 
 47. 116 U.S. 616 (1886). 
 48. Id. at 630, 633. 
 49. The government did not use a subpoena in Boyd, but the court deemed the procedure 
to be a compelled production and therefore a seizure. Id. at 634–35. 
 50. CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, PRIVACY AT RISK:  THE NEW GOVERNMENT SURVEILLANCE 
AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 140 (2007). 
 51. Boyd, 116 U.S. at 627. 
 52. Id. at 618. 
 53. Id. at 634–35. 
 54. Id. at 637. 
 55. Schnapper, supra note 21, at 869. 
 56. SLOBOGIN, supra note 50, at 148–49. 
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But even more important, the Court in Fisher v. United States57 held that 
the Fifth Amendment does not protect the contents of papers against 
compelled production, even if used against a person at trial in a criminal 
case.58  The Fifth Amendment does not protect these preexisting documents 
because the government did not compel their content when created; the 
individual author created them voluntarily.59  Now, in issuing a subpoena, 
the government merely seeks their physical surrender.60  Except as discussed 
below, the witness producing the papers has not been compelled to “testify” 
under the Fifth Amendment. 
Fisher marked the Court’s shift from the originalist, and majestic, 
approach in Boyd to a more delineated, textualist approach.61  The Court 
focused on the prohibition against compelling a person to be a “witness” 
against himself and equated this language with “testimony.”62  Unless the 
government compelled “testimony,” it had not violated the self-incrimination 
clause.63  Merely assisting the government in its prosecution by surrendering 
the incriminating documents no longer sufficed. 
We can conclude that the Court has accomplished two main results in 
undoing Boyd.  First, it has unbundled the two amendments so that they are 
no longer read together.  Rather, they each govern isolated territories.  
Second, the Court has greatly curtailed what these amendments, now read in 
isolation, protect.  As for papers, neither amendment affords much protection 
against their compelled production; they enjoy little privacy protection under 
the Fourth and little protection against self-incrimination under the Fifth.64  
Papers, once the sacred repository of private thoughts, have fallen on hard 
times.  Whereas Boyd emphasized that papers are not ordinary chattel simply 
to be physically handed over, the Court in the twentieth century treated 
papers as just that, ordinary property to be “surrendered.” 
When we apply the foregoing to electronic devices, we will initially 
observe a strict division between the Fourth and Fifth Amendments to 
highlight how current doctrine applies.  Part I.A considers the Fourth 
Amendment and its deficiencies under current case law, and the Fifth 
Amendment is similarly analyzed in Part I.B.  The end of this Article shows 
how we can reunite them; indeed, the facts on the ground, a warrant to search 
a password-protected device, requires us to consider the two amendments 
together. 
 
 57. 425 U.S. 391 (1976). 
 58. Id. at 414. 
 59. Id. at 403–04. 
 60. Id. at 411 (“The question is not of testimony but of surrender.” (quoting In re Harris, 
221 U.S. 274, 279 (1911))). 
 61. Id. at 409 (stating that Boyd was a “rule searching for a rationale”). 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. at 410. 
 64. See infra Part I.A–B. 
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A.  Fourth Amendment Deficiencies 
In this section, we assume police have a warrant to search an unlocked 
device so we can focus on the Fourth Amendment alone and bracket the Fifth 
Amendment for now.  For context, we can identify many ways in which the 
Fourth Amendment fails to protect privacy because it allows searches 
without a warrant, or even probable cause, under various exceptions.  But we 
deal here with an often-unnoticed problem:  Fourth Amendment case law 
affords too little protection to electronic devices even when government 
agents do ask a magistrate for a warrant. 
First, it is not hard to get a warrant based upon probable cause.  We assume 
the government already has arrested the suspect and therefore has probable 
cause to believe he has committed a crime.  In this context, the police only 
need the additional margin of probable cause that the government will find 
some evidence of the crime on the suspect’s smartphone or laptop.  As Paul 
Ohm has pointed out, they will almost always have such probable cause.65 
For example, in a drug investigation, law enforcement can likely meet this 
standard because drug dealers often use their phones to communicate with 
buyers and coconspirators, whether by text, email, or phone call.66  Similarly, 
white-collar criminals will often have financial information on their 
smartphones or laptops, whether in the form of communications, banking 
applications, or spreadsheets.67  Smartphones will often reveal location data 
too.68  In a child pornography case, the same evidence leading to arrest will 
often show the suspect has images on his devices—for example, evidence 
that the suspect downloaded an image or reports from a spouse or other 
family member who saw a contraband image on a device.69 
Second, once officers obtain a warrant, the Fourth Amendment’s warrant 
clause imposes few limits.  Law enforcement agents may seize a device, take 
it back to the lab, and conduct an exhaustive search in every nook and cranny 
by using advanced forensic software to guarantee nothing evades their 
notice.70 
True, the warrant clause of the Fourth Amendment contains a particularity 
clause that requires the government to state with particularity the places to 
be searched and the things to be seized.71  But numerous courts have held 
that the particular-place requirement is no more specific than the device 
itself, the type of device, or sometimes even just the residence in which the 
 
 65. Paul Ohm, Probably Probable Cause:  The Diminishing Importance of Justification 
Standards, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1514, 1515 (2010). 
 66. See, e.g., United States v. Alston, No. 15-CR-435, 2016 WL 2609521, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. 
Apr. 29, 2016). 
 67. See, e.g., United States v. Makeeff, No. 4:14–cr–00081–SMR–CF, 2015 WL 
13284966, at *1 n.4 (S.D. Iowa Feb. 6, 2015). 
 68. See, e.g., In re Smartphone Geolocation Data Application, 977 F. Supp. 2d 129, 137 
(E.D.N.Y. 2013). 
 69. See, e.g., United States v. Grauer, 701 F.3d 318, 321 (8th Cir. 2012). 
 70. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(e)(2)(B) (permitting two-step search warrant execution, where 
law enforcement can conduct an off-site search of electronic material). 
 71. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
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device might be found.72  Thus, a warrant need only list computers, memory 
media generally, or even simply a certain address.73  As for the “things to be 
seized,” a warrant might only need to recite the crime for which the police 
are seeking evidence on the device.74  It is enough to say they seek evidence 
of child pornography, for example, or tax evasion.75 
In conducting the search, courts often refuse to limit the police 
beforehand.76  In most jurisdictions, law enforcement may essentially search 
the entire device to find evidence of the crime for which it has probable 
cause.77  On the theory that a person could hide evidence in any deceptively 
labeled folder or file, law enforcement may look in every folder and file.78  
And, of course, if law enforcement agents run across evidence of another 
crime, they may immediately obtain a fresh warrant to continue searching for 
evidence of that newly discovered crime. 
As a consequence, law enforcement will typically search information 
detailing a person’s entire life.  In a drug case, for example, agents will 
review photographs and videos for evidence of guns, money, or drugs in 
pictures79 inevitably also seeing family photos, videos, and other very 
personal images.  Agents will review financial files such as excel 
spreadsheets for evidence of financial dealings80—again, likely learning 
innocent but very private information.  Agents can review emails, messages, 
and other communications for incriminating statements and to develop leads 
to other suspects.81  They can also use the device to enter other online 
accounts to further search for photos, communications, and financial 
 
 72. See Orin S. Kerr, Executing Warrants for Digital Evidence:  The Case for Use 
Restrictions on Nonresponsive Data, 48 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1, 6–7 (2015). 
 73. See id. 
 74. See United States v. Deppish, 994 F. Supp. 2d 1211, 1221 (D. Kan. 2014). 
 75. Kerr, supra note 72, at 15–17. 
 76. See id. at 8 (noting that no circuit court has “required ex ante restrictions for computer 
warrants”).  But see, e.g., In re Search Warrant, 71 A.3d 1158, 1168 (Vt. 2012) (summarizing 
the debate on whether to impose ex ante restrictions or rely on ex post judicial review and 
approving ex ante limits). 
 77. See Kerr, supra note 72, at 8.  See generally Orin S. Kerr, Ex Ante Regulation of 
Computer Search and Seizure, 96 VA. L. REV. 1241 (2010). 
 78. The Ninth Circuit has repeatedly held, for example, that even a single image or video 
of child pornography justifies agents’ search of every computer device, every folder, and every 
file. See United States v. Schesso, 730 F.3d 1040, 1046 (9th Cir. 2013) (“The government had 
no way of knowing which or how many illicit files there might be or where they might be 
stored, or of describing the items to be seized in a more precise manner.”); United States v. 
Krupa, 658 F.3d 1174, 1178 (9th Cir. 2011) (approving a search of fifteen computers based 
on one image); United States v. Brobst, 558 F.3d 982, 988, 993–94 (9th Cir. 2009) (finding 
that the search of “computers, compact disks, floppy disks, hard drives, memory cards, 
printers, and other portable digital devices, DVDs, and video tapes,” based on a witness’s 
observation of one illicit photograph in the defendant’s home, to be reasonable). 
 79. See, e.g., United States v. Burgess, 576 F.3d 1078, 1084 (10th Cir. 2009) (describing 
an agent’s search for “trophy photos”). 
 80. See, e.g., United States v. Bustamonte-Conchas, No. 13-2028, 2014 WL 12697272, at 
*3 (D.N.M. July 8, 2014) (approving a search for drug activity including bank statements, 
records of distribution, and contacts with conspirators). 
 81. See, e.g., United States v. Archibald, No. 2015-0041, 2016 WL 7469717, at *1 (D.V.I. 
Dec. 28, 2016). 
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documents, and to enter bank or travel accounts that can lead to obtaining 
bank records, hotel records, and flight information.82 
Courts have generally refused to impose limits beforehand and stated that 
a warrant supplies agents with the authorization to look for relevant evidence 
wherever it might be found.83  The Tenth Circuit, for example, held that 
agents may search for evidence of drug crimes in whatever form that might 
take, from financial documents to “trophy pictures,” and look for them in any 
type of file, such as Word, WordPerfect, Adobe, Outlook, Lotus, Excel, 
Quicken, Access, or Paradox.84  The court there drew a conclusion typical 
among other circuit courts:  in the end, there may be no practical substitute 
for actually looking in many, or perhaps all, folders and sometimes at the 
documents contained within those folders.85  Numerous scholars and courts 
have identified and attacked this broad search power, but they have struggled 
to announce workable solutions.86 
The Fourth Amendment thus imposes few real restrictions on the search 
of electronic devices.  If a suspect must surrender her password in the face of 
government compulsion, law enforcement will immediately obtain access to 
the entirety of her online life.  Thus, much hinges on whether the government 
can compel this password under the Fifth Amendment. 
The foregoing reflects the Court’s sharp withdrawal from the protection of 
papers and electronic files and the privacy of their contents under both the 
Fourth and Fifth Amendments, but the twenty-first century has brought two 
promising developments.  First, the Court in Riley v. California87 erected a 
new Fourth Amendment principle with respect to electronic data.88  Riley 
addressed an exception to the warrant requirement, but its general thrust 
could reinvigorate efforts to limit the scope of execution of warrants on 
electronic devices. 
Second, the Court in Fisher left open an exception to its principle that the 
Fifth Amendment does not protect the content of papers—the act-of-
production doctrine.89  In the years since, the Supreme Court90 and lower 
courts91 have enlarged this exception to provide a surprisingly wide avenue 
for the protection of papers against compelled production.  The Court has 
 
 82. See Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2490 (2014) (describing the range of 
information available on mobile phone applications). 
 83. See, e.g., Burgess, 576 F.3d at 1094.  But see Kerr, supra note 77, at 1248–60 
(describing ex ante restrictions imposed by some courts). 
 84. Burgess, 576 F.3d at 1093. 
 85. See id. at 1094. 
 86. See generally Gershowitz, supra note 22; Kerr, supra note 72. 
 87. 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014). 
 88. Id. at 2478 (stating that “[a]bsent more precise guidance from the founding era,” the 
Court would perform a balancing test for cases involving electronic data). 
 89. Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 410 (1976) (“The act of producing evidence in 
response to a subpoena nevertheless has communicative aspects of its own, wholly aside from 
the contents of the papers produced.”). 
 90. See generally United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27 (2000). 
 91. See generally, e.g., United States v. Greenfield, 831 F.3d 106 (2d Cir. 2016); United 
States v. Ponds, 454 F.3d 313 (D.C. Cir. 2006). 
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also noted that the roots of the Fifth Amendment lie, in part, on principles 
opposed to government fishing expeditions and that it would interpret the 
act-of-production doctrine liberally, when necessary to enforce this norm.92  
This act-of-production doctrine, therefore, will form the backbone for 
developing a rule for the protection of passwords. 
B.  Fifth Amendment Protections:  The Act-of-Production Doctrine 
The Court in Fisher refused to accord Fifth Amendment protection to the 
content of papers, but, at the same time, it announced an exception.  The Fifth 
Amendment does protect against the compelled production of papers when 
the act of production itself would be testimonial.93  That is, “testimony” 
protected by the Fifth Amendment is not the content of the papers, but rather 
the physical act of production to the extent that the act itself communicates 
incriminating information.94 
For example, if the government orders a suspected felon-in-possession to 
produce any firearms and he does so, he has communicated the fact that he 
possessed a firearm by the act of producing it.95  He could only physically 
hand it over, after all, if he possessed it.  Because possession is an element 
of the crime, the defendant, by physically handing over the gun, has 
implicitly admitted to incriminating facts about the suspected crime.  At trial, 
the prosecutor could point to the defendant’s production as strong evidence 
that he possessed the gun—and that he “knowingly” possessed as well. 
To take another example, if a person ordered to produce all sources of 
income provides a bank statement, he has implicitly provided some evidence 
that the bank statement is authentic.  After all, it came from his file, so 
possession here tends to authenticate the document as his bank statement.  
More significantly, since he produced it in response to a question about his 
income, he thinks it is responsive, and this inference from his belief also tends 
to authenticate it.96 
Thus, Fisher held that the act of production can be testimonial and 
therefore protected by the Fifth Amendment if it discloses any of three 
categories of testimony:  the “existence,” “possession,” or “authenticity” of 
the documents produced.97  One might challenge whether we should count 
such an act as “testimonial” at all; after all, a suspect reveals this information 
inadvertently as a necessary byproduct of handing over the documents.  He 
does not intend to communicate this information; he simply cannot help but 
 
 92. Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 32. 
 93. Fisher, 425 U.S. at 410. 
 94. Id. at 410–11. 
 95. See Commonwealth v. Hughes, 404 N.E.2d 1239, 1244 (Mass. 1980) (“If the 
defendant should produce the revolver, he would be making implicitly a statement about its 
existence, location and control to which the Commonwealth says it would allude at trial to 
show he had possession and control at some point after the alleged crime.”). 
 96. See, e.g., Fisher, 425 U.S. at 410 (stating that the defendant’s turning over of 
documents expresses “[his] belief that the papers are those described in the subpoena,” but 
there, he was not the author, nor was he able to authenticate them). 
 97. Id. at 410, 428–29; see also Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 36. 
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lead an observer to draw the natural inference.  Fisher does not address this 
problem or explain why such inadvertent byproduct communications should 
count as testimony.  We must therefore accept that such acts count as 
testimonial, though I will refer to this type of testimony as “quasi testimony” 
for much of this Article.98 
Another problem arises with inadvertent communication testimony.  By 
the Court’s definition,99 every act of producing documents will be 
testimonial.  After all, every such act of production will communicate some 
information concerning the existence, possession, and authenticity of the 
documents.  Without some limit, the act-of-production doctrine would 
swallow the rule that the Fifth Amendment does not protect against the 
compelled production of documents. 
Perhaps with this breadth in mind, the Court in Fisher imposed two limits 
to the act-of-production doctrine—limits to what would count as 
“testimonial” in this context.  First, the testimonial aspect of the production 
must be “sufficiently testimonial.”100  Second, the act of production will not 
count as testimonial if it is a “foregone conclusion” that the government 
already knows that the document exists, the person possesses it, and it is 
authentic.101 
The Court in Fisher did not explain what principle it would use to measure 
how testimony will be sufficiently testimonial.  Later cases do not readily 
illuminate the concept.  Instead, in cases where the government seeks to use 
directly at trial the evidence produced, courts seem willing to find the 
defendant’s act of producing such evidence sufficiently testimonial.102  For 
example, if the government compels the production of child pornography 
from a defendant’s laptop, the court will not make a separate inquiry into 
whether this production would be sufficiently testimonial.  The production 
immediately admits two central elements of the crime:  that the defendant 
possessed the contraband and likely did so knowingly.103  As a consequence, 
at least in child pornography cases, we can assume the sufficiently 
testimonial requirement is always met. 
The Court in Fisher also imposed a second limit to this act-of-production 
exception—an exception to the exception—called the “foregone conclusion 
doctrine.”104  If the information disclosed by the act of production is a 
foregone conclusion, meaning the government already knows it, then this act 
of production does not count as testimonial.  Under this doctrine, if the 
 
 98. “Quasi testimony” shows that this inadvertent communication does not entirely 
resemble ordinary speech, in which a person does intend the words to communicate and not 
merely as abstract sounds or grunts.  The term also reminds us that the Court affords act-of-
production testimony less protection under the Fifth Amendment than it does to full-fledged 
oral or written testimony. 
 99. See supra note 97 and accompanying text. 
 100. Fisher, 425 U.S. at 411. 
 101. Id. 
 102. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated Mar. 25, 2011, 670 F.3d 
1335, 1346–49 (11th Cir. 2012). 
 103. Id. at 1346. 
 104. Fisher, 425 U.S. at 411; see also United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 44 (2000). 
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government knows the suspect possesses a particular document that it can 
describe with reasonable particularity then the suspect’s act of production 
adds little to the government’s overall knowledge.  That production, 
therefore, would not count as testimonial.105  If agents see an image of child 
pornography on a device before the defendant closes and locks it, those 
agents have likely also met the test.106 
We might be tempted to say that the foregone conclusion doctrine 
measures whether, or to what degree, the testimony is incriminating.  If the 
government already knows the person possesses the document, their 
production will not be highly incriminating, or at least its marginal value will 
not be.  But Fisher, other courts, and scholars have correctly noted that the 
foregone conclusion doctrine rests not with whether the facts communicated 
are additionally incriminating, but rather with the threshold question of 
whether the court will count the act of production as testimony at all.107 
In elaborating upon this foregone conclusion test, it is useful to divide 
between existence and possession on the one hand, and authenticity on the 
other.  For existence and possession, the Second Circuit, the D.C. Circuit, 
and others have held that the government cannot merely infer the suspect 
possesses the demanded document; rather, it must know.108  For example, 
the court in United States v. Greenfield109 held that it is not enough that 
business people often possess certain documents or that it is customary for 
them to do so.110  But if the government can identify particular bank 
accounts, it can usually establish that it knows that monthly statements for 
that account exist and that the defendant possesses them.111 
For authenticity under the foregone conclusion doctrine, the government 
must show it can independently authenticate the required document at trial 
under the rules of evidence.112  For a bank account statement, the government 
can establish this requirement by pointing to an available bank employee who 
could testify that the account statement is what it purports to be.113 
Below, we apply the authenticity prong to encrypted devices and see that 
it amounts to our proposed rule of particularity:  the government must know 
 
 105. Fisher, 425 U.S. at 411. 
 106. See In re Boucher, No. 2:06-mj-91, 2009 WL 424718, at *3 (D. Vt. Feb. 19, 2009). 
 107. See Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 29; Fisher, 425 U.S. at 411; Minerva Pinto, The Future of 
the Foregone Conclusion Doctrine and Compelled Decryption in the Age of Cloud Computing, 
25 TEMP. POL. & C.R. L. REV. 223, 223 (2016). 
 108. See United States v. Ponds, 454 F.3d 313, 324–26 (D.C. Cir. 2006); see also United 
States v. Greenfield, 831 F.3d 106, 118–19 (2d Cir. 2016); United States v. Fox, 721 F.2d 32, 
37 (2d Cir. 1983); In re Boucher, 2009 WL 424718, at *3. 
 109. 831 F.3d 106 (2d Cir. 2016). 
 110. Cf. id. at 118, 122. 
 111. Id. at 119; see also United States v. Bright, 596 F.3d 683, 692–94 (9th Cir. 2010); 
United States v. Norwood, 420 F.3d 888, 895 (8th Cir. 2005). 
 112. Greenfield, 831 F.3d at 120. 
 113. Id.  But if the bank is foreign, sometimes the government cannot make this showing 
because foreign banks will sometimes refuse to supply a witness to authenticate a client’s bank 
account statements. Id. 
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the defendant possesses the document and be able to describe it with 
reasonable particularity. 
II.  ENCRYPTED DEVICES 
When we say a device such as a laptop or smartphone is “locked” with a 
password, we mean not only that the device will not operate but that its 
storage memory is encrypted.114  This Part first considers the scope of this 
encryption and, second, describes how encryption works. 
A.  Scope of Encryption 
This Article focuses on encrypted devices that law enforcement has validly 
seized—data “at rest.”  But Apple and other communication platforms, such 
as WhatsApp and Facebook, have made end-to-end encryption standard for 
messages.115  Similarly, internet web browsing and transactions are 
increasingly encrypted as they travel from host to server.116  This means law 
enforcement agents cannot readily gain access to electronic 
communications—whether in real time or historically—from the 
intermediary service providers, as they once easily could.  Now, law 
enforcement must seize a suspect’s device and obtain any communications 
directly from the party to the communication.  In other words, even 
communications have become, from a law enforcement viewpoint, data at 
rest.  These communications are encrypted on the device and, like everything 
else, inaccessible to law enforcement without the password or some 
workaround.117 
One of these workarounds, of course, is for law enforcement to obtain the 
data from the cloud.118  But, even on the cloud, providers will increasingly 
encrypt both backups and other cloud storage in such a way that the provider 
 
 114. Many smartphones encrypt by default; however, users often must still enable 
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Google and Apple to Introduce Default Encryption, BBC (Sept. 19, 2014), 
https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-29276955 [https://perma.cc/5B8J-M878]. 
 115. See End-to-End Encryption, WHATSAPP, https://faq.whatsapp.com/en/ 
android/28030015/ [https://perma.cc/Y6PG-2Z3R] (last visited Aug. 24, 2018) (stating that 
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the WhatsApp application); Privacy, APPLE, https://www.apple.com/privacy/approach-to-
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such encryption). 
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Transparency Report, GOOGLE, https://www.google.com/transparencyreport/https/?hl=en 
[https://perma.cc/8WX8-X7W4] (last visited Aug. 24, 2018). 
 117. See generally Kerr & Schneier, supra note 27 (canvassing possible workarounds). 
 118. Id. at 1010. 
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itself will be unable to decrypt them.119  The cloud too, therefore, will come 
to resemble an encrypted device. 
Finally, law enforcement will need an individual’s passwords to conduct 
other types of investigations.  New technology such as Bitcoin and other 
cryptocurrencies, and new legal instruments such as smart contracts, all 
depend upon a person keeping safe and secret passwords.  Often, no 
centralized institution will have that password, so law enforcement will be 
able to access the Bitcoin, for example, only by compelling a person to reveal 
their password.120  Consequently, what goes for the encrypted device will 
similarly apply to a vast array of investigative areas. 
B.  How Encryption Works 
When we say a password locks a device, we refer to a few related 
protections based upon strong cryptography.  Let us first consider 
smartphones such as the iPhone.  First, when a person enters a password, the 
device verifies the password so that it will operate.  The device verifies the 
password to release a longer, stronger encryption key, which, in turn, unlocks 
another series of encryption keys down a hierarchy ultimately allowing the 
device to work and access all the data kept on storage memory.121 
Second, the smartphone decrypts the storage memory so that the device 
and user can access the messages, documents, photos, and other files and data 
on the device.  This means that if law enforcement simply removes the 
storage media from the device—its hard drive or hybrid flash drive—and 
accesses the drive directly with laboratory equipment, investigators will face 
an encrypted scramble.  Without the password, it is nearly impossible to 
decrypt the hard drive.  For smartphones, the password will only work to 
decrypt the hard drive if the drive remains within the device, because 
decryption depends upon a chain of encryption keys, some of which are 
within the hard circuitry of the device itself.122 
The above applies to nearly all smartphones because most automatically 
encrypt their contents.123  Every time its owner enters her passcode or 
password and “unlocks” the phone, she also decrypts its contents, or at least 
makes them available to be decrypted.124  Laptops and desktops may not 
encrypt their hard drives or other persistent storage as thoroughly or 
 
 119. See iCloud Security Overview, APPLE, https://support.apple.com/en-us/ht202303 
[https://perma.cc/46G9-2M6T] (last visited Aug. 24, 2018). 
 120. A person ultimately controls their Bitcoin or other cryptocurrency by way of a much 
longer private key.  Usually a person accesses that key by way of a shorter password or, more 
often, passphrase. See infra notes 226–28 and accompanying text.  Either way, the government 
will need to compel this content from the individual herself. 
 121. See APPLE, supra note 7, at 13–16. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. (noting that each device has a unique ID number burned into its hardware to power 
the AES 256 encryption engine). 
 124. iPhones build a hierarchy of encryption keys upon the hardware key in order to encrypt 
and decrypt files as they are added or read. Id. 
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automatically as does a smartphone.  But, individuals can take deliberate 
steps to encrypt even these devices125 as well as their cloud data.126 
1.  Passwords, Passcodes, and Keys 
This Article focuses on a suspect’s password or passcode, often as short as 
four or six digits.  For simplicity’s sake, we will proceed as if a password or 
passcode directly encrypts and decrypts the device and a court order directs 
a person to enter this password or passcode. 
But the password or passcode does not, itself, encrypt or decrypt the 
device.127  Rather, when a user enters a password, the device verifies it 
without recording it long term.  Once it verifies the password, the device can 
access the actual encryption key or keys and use this separate, far longer key 
to encrypt and decrypt the device.  Nothing in the argument below depends 
upon this difference—the only important point is that the device, through the 
magic of encryption technology, can verify the user’s password without 
recording it. 
2.  Deniability 
More advanced encryption affords users “deniability” by giving them two 
passwords.  One password decrypts the encrypted drive correctly to its real 
documents.  The other password decrypts at least part of the drive to realistic, 
but dummy, documents that the user supplies, leaving the real files encrypted.  
The suspect can thus supply the fake password that will decrypt the drive, or 
a portion of it, to innocent documents in a way that appears to truly decrypt 
the drive.128 
III.  CATEGORIES OF COMPULSION 
We can now turn more directly to the law of encrypted devices, but we 
cannot properly evaluate a claimed Fifth Amendment privilege without first 
deciding how to characterize and categorize the compulsion itself.  Courts 
and scholars have not comprehensively categorized the different scenarios 
 
 125. See Use FileVault to Encrypt the Startup Disk on Your Mac, APPLE, 
https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT204837 [https://perma.cc/6LWB-94QW] (last visited 
Aug. 24, 2018).  Numerous established security outfits provide rigorous disk encryption 
software such as VeraCrypt and Symantec. See Neil J. Rubenking, The Best Encryption 
Software of 2018, PC MAG. (July 17, 2018, 1:01 PM), https://www.pcmag.com/article/ 
347066/the-best-encryption-software-of-2016 [https://perma.cc/C65M-JARB]. 
 126. RASS & SLAMANIG, supra note 34, at 1 (“Cloud computing is one of these new areas, 
where cryptography is expected to unveil its power by bringing striking new features to the 
cloud.”). 
 127. See Brief of Amicus Curiae Professor David W. Opderbeck et al. at 6, Commonwealth 
v. Gelfgatt, 11 N.E.3d 605 (Mass. 2014). 
 128. Gelfgatt, 11 N.E.3d at 616–17 (holding that the defendant could be ordered to enter 
the real password and not the secondary password). 
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pertaining to encrypted devices nor provided a theoretical foundation for 
those scenarios.129  This Part therefore fills this gap. 
First, this Part considers scenarios where law enforcement compels a 
defendant to state his password orally or write it down.  This is an important 
scenario because it forms the foundation for understanding, by contrast, how 
to characterize merely entering a password.  Second, this Part briefly 
considers whether the government may subpoena documents in which the 
suspect has written down her password, such as the sticky note posted to the 
edge of the computer screen or a written list naming accounts or devices with 
their respective passwords.  Third, this Part then considers the compulsion to 
enter a password such that no one observes the password and the device does 
not record it.  Finally, this Part considers thumbprints and facial recognition 
used to open a device. 
A.  Compulsion of Passwords Directly 
The government may require a defendant, subject, or witness to provide 
her passcode in a number of ways.  In some cases, the government simply 
orders the defendant to state her password.130  In others, the government 
might use a subpoena ad testificandum to order the defendant to appear to 
testify and then ask her for the password or order her to write it down.131  If 
the witness refuses to comply, law enforcement may seek a court order 
compelling her to comply on pain of contempt and potentially face jail 
time.132  Or police officers may take a suspect into custody and request the 
passcode before they provide the Miranda warnings—such a request would 
likely constitute interrogation and therefore compelled testimony under 
Miranda. 
These methods of compelling a password directly involve testimony in its 
purest form and therefore should trigger direct Fifth Amendment protections.  
As the Supreme Court has said on numerous occasions, compelled oral 
statements of facts will usually be considered testimonial,133 and this case 
should be no exception.  In such instances, the Court has held that “the vast 
majority of verbal statements thus will be testimonial” because they likely 
“convey information or assert facts.”134  The Court has repeatedly connected 
testimony to true or false statements—particularly instances in which a 
person could lie—in part because of the history of the Fifth Amendment.  
 
 129. But see generally Cohen & Park, supra note 18 (drawing different categories from 
those sketched here and focusing on the difference between compelling entering a password 
versus compelling production of decrypted versions of the files). 
 130. See generally, e.g., Commonwealth v. Baust, 89 Va. Cir. 267 (2014).  Though far from 
clear, the government in that case appeared simply to compel the defendant to state his 
passcode. See id.  Ultimately, the court held that the defendant could be compelled to produce 
his fingerprint but could not be compelled to produce his passcode. See id. 
 131. See, e.g., United States v. Kirschner, 823 F. Supp. 2d 665, 666 (E.D. Mich. 2010). 
 132. FED. R. CRIM. P. 17(g) (stating that a court can hold a witness “who disobeys a 
subpoena issued by a federal court” in contempt). 
 133. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 589 (1990). 
 134. Id. at 597 (quoting Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201, 213 (1988)). 
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One of the Court’s chief objectives is to prevent the government from placing 
a suspect in the “cruel trilemma” by forcing him to decide whether to tell the 
truth and incriminate himself, lie and perjure himself, or refuse to answer and 
face contempt and jail.135 
Put another way, when a person discloses her password orally or in writing 
to agents for the specific device the police have seized, she likely is also 
disclosing her password to other, innocent devices, as well as to many of her 
online accounts including social media, bank, and email accounts.  The 
content of the password thus provides law enforcement agents with 
information they can use to access these other portions of the suspect’s life. 
For these numerous reasons, courts and scholars agree that the Fifth 
Amendment, at its core, protects statements that are true or false, and stating 
a password to authorities falls within this core protection.136  The words and 
letters the suspect utters are either the password to this device or they are not. 
This situation does not fall into the narrow class of cases in which verbal 
statements might not count as testimony, as occurred in Pennsylvania v. 
Muniz.137  There, officers asked a drunk suspect to state his name, his age, 
and other facts.138  He stumbled over the answers because he was drunk.139  
The Court held these statements were not testimonial.140  Although the 
decision was fractured, we can interpret the case as holding that the 
government did not rely upon the truth or falsity of the statement to 
incriminate the defendant, but rather the manner in which he delivered the 
answers.141 
In compelling a password, by contrast, the government does not rely upon 
the manner in which the suspect states the password—whether she hesitates, 
struggles to remember it, or states it immediately.  Rather, the government 
relies upon the truth or falsity of the password to decrypt the documents. 
Although we might wonder whether the government can give the suspect 
immunity and then compel her to disclose her password orally, this method 
does not provide a solution.  Under Kastigar v. United States,142 any 
immunity the government affords in exchange for disclosure of the password 
will also protect any fruits or derivative use.143  This means that the immunity 
will likewise protect the documents the password decrypts, as well as any 
information contained within those documents.  Similarly, the immunity will 
protect any information derived from the documents.  Immunizing oral 
disclosure of the password will effectively immunize everything.  This strong 
 
 135. Id. at 596. 
 136. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated Mar. 25, 2011, 670 F.3d 
1335, 1346 (11th Cir. 2012); Kirschner, 823 F. Supp. 2d at 669. 
 137. 496 U.S. 582 (1990). 
 138. Id. at 590. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. at 600. 
 141. Id. at 592; Ronald J. Allen & M. Kristin Mace, The Self-Incrimination Clause 
Explained and Its Future Predicted, 94 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 243, 273–74 (2004). 
 142. 406 U.S. 441 (1972). 
 143. Id. at 444–45. 
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Kastigar immunity arises from the nature of stating a password as ordinary, 
oral testimony enjoying full Fifth Amendment protection and stands in 
contrast to the more limited effect of granting act-of-production immunity. 
B.  Sticky Notes 
In a different scenario, law enforcement subpoenas the suspect to produce 
any documents that contain the password, such as a sticky note on a desk at 
home.  Under Fisher, such compulsion does not directly violate the Fifth 
Amendment because the person voluntarily created the document before the 
subpoena and has thus not been compelled.144  But the Fifth Amendment may 
protect against such compulsion if the act of producing documents with the 
password would, itself, be testimonial. 
Producing a written password admits that the person has written it down 
and that they possess the password, but this fact is neither incriminatory nor 
does it lead to incriminatory evidence.  Possession of a password is not a 
crime.  True, the content of the password shows that a person has access to a 
particular device, but under Fisher, the contents of documents are not 
protected.145 
But when we consider authentication, we see why a person might enjoy 
act-of-production protection over a sticky note with a password.  If the 
subpoena demands the password for a particular device, in producing the 
sticky note, a suspect implicitly testifies that the number written there is a 
password and that it is a password for this device.146  In other words, she 
authenticates the content by producing it.  But, if the sticky note says 
“iPhone:  1234,” then the note is likely self-authenticating, and her act of 
producing it would not be sufficiently testimonial to warrant protection. 
C.  Entering a Password into the Device 
We now come to the central, paradigmatic scenario:  an order requiring the 
defendant to enter his password into the device to allow the government to 
access decrypted versions of the files on the drive.  No one observes the 
password entered, and the device itself makes no record of the password. 
On its surface, the government is not compelling testimony but a mere 
physical act; however, this section suggests three analogies to characterize 
 
 144. See supra notes 57–60 and accompanying text; cf. United States v. Pearson, No. 1:04-
CR-340, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32982, at *54 (N.D.N.Y. May 24, 2006) (“Defendant more 
than likely reduced the password to writing.  Production of this voluntarily created writing 
would not, the Government argues, constitute compulsion.  Defendant has not responded to 
this argument.”). 
 145. See United States v. Ponds, 454 F.3d 313, 323 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (“[T]he contents of 
the documents are irrelevant for constitutional purposes because their preparation was not 
‘compelled.’ . . .  Therefore, to determine whether an act of production implicates the Fifth 
Amendment, the court looks only to the communicative aspects of the act of production itself.” 
(quoting Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 409–10 (1976))).  However, under Hubbell, 
when considering the existence prong, it is possible that the content of documents can count 
as the source of incrimination. See United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 31 (2000). 
 146. See supra notes 93–96 and accompanying text. 
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the compelled act of entering a password147—oral testimony, a physical act, 
or an act of producing documents. 
As for legal process, the government may serve upon the suspect a 
document subpoena requiring he produce decrypted versions of the 
encrypted files.148  This subpoena, of course, is a legal fiction:  the 
government already controls the device and actually requires that the 
defendant enter his password.  Alternatively, the government may obtain an 
All Writs Act order requiring the defendant assist in the execution of the 
underlying search warrant by entering his password, or a “decryption 
order.”149  These processes all require precisely the same act by the suspect:  
enter a correct password into the device—and then walk away.150 
1.  Oral Testimony 
We could consider entering a password into the device as analogous to 
compelling the defendant to state the password orally to law enforcement 
agents.  If so, the Fifth Amendment would prohibit compelling a defendant 
to enter his password for the reasons discussed above.151  This section will 
canvas the similarities and differences between entering a password and oral 
testimony. 
First, typing a password seems quite similar to stating it or writing it down.  
But this similarity largely evaporates when we consider that no agent 
observes the typing or records the password and, perhaps more important, the 
device itself can verify the password is correct without keeping a record of 
it.152  This compulsion thus resembles an order for a suspect to go into a room 
and whisper something to himself—a secret act that is oral but does not really 
resemble testimony. 
Second, one could argue that entering a password, just like disclosing it to 
law enforcement, has the same end result:  agents get access to the device.  
But this result alone cannot decide the issue because the same is true of a true 
 
 147. Some may wish to analogize compelling a person to enter a password to the 
government compelling a person to secretly enter a combination to a safe so law enforcement 
agents may access the files within.  This is a precise analogy, but it does not help because the 
Supreme Court has not addressed the safe scenario either.  In other words, our analysis must 
answer both scenarios. 
 148. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated Mar. 25, 2011, 670 F.3d 
1335, 1339, 1349–50 (11th Cir. 2012) (holding that the government may only compel this 
production if it also grants the subpoena recipient immunity). 
 149. See, e.g., United States v. Apple MacPro Comput., 851 F.3d 238, 243 (3d Cir. 2017). 
 150. In contrast, this Article proposes a rule of particularity that would require that the 
defendant decrypt only those files that meet the test. See infra Part IV.C. 
 151. See supra Part III.A.  This inquiry focuses not on whether the act of entering a 
password is testimonial, but rather whether it is tantamount to oral testimony.  This Article 
concludes that the act of entering the password is “testimonial” as the Court uses that phrase, 
but only the weaker, quasi testimony that arises under the act-of-production cases. See infra 
Part IV.  In other words, entering a password is testimonial, but it is more like act-of-
production testimony than oral testimony. 
 152. See Kerr & Schneier, supra note 27, at 994–95. 
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key.  If the suspect has been ordered simply to turn a key, that act would 
likely not constitute full-fledged testimony even though it has the same result. 
A third argument presents a powerful case:  compelling a person to enter 
a password, even secretly, requires him to use the contents of his mind to 
further the prosecution’s case.  The Court has often considered, as a 
shorthand method to measure whether an act counts as testimony, whether 
the compulsion requires the suspect to use the contents of his mind.153  One 
could elaborate upon this argument by saying the use of the mind does not 
involve simply the entering of a password, an act that may come almost as 
second nature, but all the mental energy that has gone into creating, 
memorizing, and maintaining the password. 
In response to this third argument, we may say that the suspect does not 
communicate these mental steps to any outsider.  That is, even if we were to 
accept the view that an act might be testimonial because it incorporates 
antecedent mental activity, that still does not seem to make the resulting act 
itself similar to oral testimony.  Indeed, the Court uses this test, the use of 
the contents of the mind, merely to determine whether an act counts as 
“testimony” at all, not whether it is tantamount to full, oral testimony.154 
Finally, compelling a person to enter her password may place her in the 
position of the cruel trilemma.155  She may decide to enter the correct 
password and potentially incriminate herself, to lie by entering the wrong 
password,156 or refuse to enter anything and face contempt. 
Here too, this cruel trilemma argument helps us see that the act of entering 
the password is testimonial, but more like act-of-production testimony than 
full, oral testimony.  This follows because agents will immediately know if 
the suspect has entered the wrong password—the device will not open and 
will indicate that the wrong password has been entered by vibrating, for 
example.  As a result, this lie—or false entry—is not material and therefore 
not perjury.157  No one relies on its truth in any way and the lie is of no 
consequence to the action because agents immediately and certainly know 
the password is wrong.158 
One niche case arising out of sophisticated encryption schemes may 
implicate the cruel trilemma in a manner that seems analogous to oral 
testimony.  These programs will supply a user with two passwords:  one is 
the real password that decrypts the disk to the original contents, but the 
 
 153. See, e.g., United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 43 (2000) (quoting Curcio v. United 
States, 354 U.S. 118, 128 (1957)); In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated Mar. 25, 
2011, 670 F.3d 1335, 1345–46 (11th Cir. 2012). 
 154. Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 43. 
 155. See supra note 135 and accompanying text. 
 156. If she does so ten times with an iPhone, she knows this will potentially lock the phone 
forever. See APPLE, supra note 7. 
 157. See United States v. Martinez, 855 F.2d 621, 623 (9th Cir. 1988) (“A false statement 
is not perjurious unless material.”); see also 18 U.S.C. § 1623(a) (2012) (criminalizing the act 
of making a “false material declaration” to a court or grand jury). 
 158. United States v. Cromitie, 727 F.3d 194, 221–22 (2d Cir. 2013) (“[P]erjury is 
‘material’ if there is any ‘reasonable likelihood that the false testimony could have affected 
the judgment of the jury.’” (quoting United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 103 (1976))). 
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second one is a dummy password that works but “decrypts” at least part of 
the disk to files that are not the real files.159  They are plausible in that they 
appear to be real files, but they are not the originals.160  This feature of 
encryption is called deniability.  Thus, this suspect faces a true temptation to 
lie and enter her dummy password.  And if she enters the dummy password, 
agents will not immediately realize it and may rely on what appears on the 
disk—a disk that contains innocent files only. 
For now, at least, we can put aside this niche case because deniable 
encryption remains rare.  But as encryption develops, we may need to take 
this problem more seriously.  When we do, however, we might conclude that 
supplying a false password still resembles act-of-production testimony more 
than oral testimony.  After all, a person producing documents can produce 
false, innocent documents; his act of producing them will implicitly 
communicate that the documents are authentic when he knows that they are 
not.  Despite this possibility, we still deem the act-of-production testimony 
to be on a lesser plane than oral testimony. 
Few cases expressly consider this question,161 and those that do find that 
typing in a password, or opening a combination lock, counts as testimony, 
but not necessarily testimony on the level of ordinary, oral testimony.  Rather, 
the courts suggest that entering a password counts as quasi testimony akin to 
an act of production.162 
2.  Pure Physical Act 
At the other end of the spectrum, we could treat the act of entering the 
password as a pure physical act deserving no protection whatsoever under 
the Fifth Amendment—not even the quasi-testimonial act-of-production 
protection.  The main precedent concerning compelled, incriminatory acts 
arise from a long series of “physical characteristic” cases.  In these cases, the 
government has compelled the suspect or defendant to perform a physical act 
that will potentially incriminate him.  In the leading Supreme Court cases, 
the government required the defendants to wear a shirt found at the scene of 
the crime so the jury could see whether it fits,163 to display his face,164 to 
provide a handwriting sample,165 and to supply a voice exemplar.166 
 
 159. See Timothy A. Wiseman, Encryption, Forced Decryption, and the Constitution, 11 
I/S 525, 570–72 (2015). 
 160. Id. 
 161. See Reply Brief of Appellant at 11–12, United States v. Apple MacPro Comput., 851 
F.3d 238 (3d Cir. 2017); cf. United States v. Green, 272 F.3d 748, 753–54 (5th Cir. 2001). 
 162. See Apple MacPro Comput., 851 F.3d at 247–48. 
 163. Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245, 252–53 (1910). 
 164. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 222 (1967). 
 165. Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 265–67 (1967) (discussing the requirement for the 
defendant to provide a handwriting sample to see if his handwriting matched that of the 
robbery note). 
 166. United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 5–6 (1973). 
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In every case the compelled act may incriminate, but the Court repeatedly 
held that the Fifth Amendment did not apply at all.167  The acts merely 
displayed physical characteristics of the defendant, and the defendant 
enjoyed no privilege to hide these.168  Even a handwriting or voice exemplar, 
which veer closest to testimony, do not enjoy protection because they are 
physical characteristics.169  Additionally, the government compels them not 
for their truth but for their manner; it does not matter what the person writes, 
but merely how he forms the letters.170 
Compelling a person to enter a password differs.  First, it is not a physical 
characteristic to distinguish or identify a person.  Put another way, the 
government does not compel the act to weigh the manner in which it is done.  
Rather, it compels the act because its communicative content will open the 
device.  Compelling a person to enter a password thus does not resemble the 
physical characteristic cases for us to determine that such an act does not 
enjoy Fifth Amendment protection. 
3.  Production of Documents 
The third analogy, the one upon which we settle, as have most courts,171 
is that entering a password bears the closest resemblance to the act of 
producing documents.  In both cases, the government seeks documents and 
the act produces them.  But more importantly, the testimonial nature of each 
act bears striking similarities that help us understand how the Fifth 
Amendment relates to the act of entering a password.  As noted above, the 
act of producing a document or item communicates in a few ways.172  If the 
government compels a person to produce any guns, by producing a gun the 
person communicates that he possesses the gun, that he knows he possesses 
the gun, and that it is, in fact, a gun (because it shows he believes it is a gun). 
When a person opens a device by entering a password, that act similarly 
communicates that he controls the device and therefore possesses the 
documents on it.  It communicates that he likely possesses those documents 
knowingly.  Finally, he authenticates the documents.  The subpoena seeks 
decrypted versions of the encrypted files, and by entering his password and 
unlocking the device, he has demonstrated that the now decrypted files match 
the encrypted files previously on the drive. 
Finally, in both cases the government will use the evidence in similar ways 
at trial.  If the defendant produces the gun, the government would like to use 
that act as evidence at trial that he possessed the gun.  In fact, it may well be 
the only evidence showing such possession.  Similarly, the government 
 
 167. Id. at 7; Gilbert, 388 U.S. at 266; Wade, 388 U.S. at 222–23; Holt, 218 U.S. at 252–
53. 
 168. See cases cited supra note 167 
 169. Dionisio, 410 U.S. at 6. 
 170. Gilbert, 388 U.S. at 266. 
 171. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated Mar. 25, 2011, 670 F.3d 
1335, 1342–46 (11th Cir. 2012); Commonwealth v. Gelfgatt, 11 N.E.3d 605, 614–15 (Mass. 
2014). 
 172. See supra Part I.C. 
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would like to use the fact that the defendant entered the password to establish 
that the files it introduces at trial were previously in the defendant’s 
possession, he knew he possessed them, and that they are the same images as 
the encrypted files originally on his drive when seized. 
One could object and argue that ordering a defendant to enter his password 
differs from a document subpoena.  In an ordinary document subpoena, the 
government seeks documents that already exist, and Fisher held the Fifth 
Amendment does not protect against producing documents precisely because 
they already exist.173  But when a person enters his password, the decrypted 
version of the documents do not already exist; that is precisely the 
government’s problem.  Rather than requiring the suspect to produce existing 
documents, it has required him to create documents—leading us to wonder 
whether the Fifth Amendment might protect them for this reason. 
This argument sounds more appealing than it really is.174  When a person 
decrypts a document, he does not really create a new document in the relevant 
sense.  After all, he originally created the document in plaintext, so the 
document is preexisting in this sense.  When he closes his computer, the 
software encrypts the drive so that the plaintext document becomes 
scrambled into an encrypted jumble of bits.175  But asking him to decrypt it 
again merely asks him to restore the original document he created.  In other 
words, he has not been compelled to create new content but merely to restore 
old content. 
Furthermore, when a person decrypts, he does not read the encrypted 
version and translate it using his cognitive powers.  Entering or uttering the 
password itself may constitute testimony,176 but that does not mean he has 
created new documents merely by decrypting them. 
IV.  COMPELLING DECRYPTED VERSIONS 
We have concluded that entering a password resembles the act of 
production, but this doctrine includes a proliferation of tests, exceptions, and 
variations.  Testimony falls into three categories:  existence, possession, and 
authenticity.  The testimony must be sufficiently testimonial, by some 
mysterious measure.177  For existence cases, at least, the Court requires that 
the defendant make extensive use of the contents of his mind to count as 
sufficiently testimonial.  But for possession and authenticity cases, it seems 
enough that the document produced would be used at trial.  Finally, the 
government can still compel testimony if it satisfies the foregone conclusion 
doctrine.  This Part discusses the categories of act-of-production cases and 
applies the doctrine to encrypted devices. 
 
 173. Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 411 (1976). 
 174. See generally Cohen & Park, supra note 18. 
 175. See id. (manuscript at 7). 
 176. See supra Part III.C.1. 
 177. See supra notes 100–03 and accompanying text. 
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A.  The Three Prongs and a Rule of Particularity 
The “existence” prong captures the idea that if government agents know 
that the suspect possesses the file, they also know that suspect knows it exists.  
In this respect, the suspect does not make “extensive use of ‘the contents of 
his mind’”178 in entering a password, so the test for whether something is 
sufficiently testimonial for the existence prong might not be met anyway.  
Therefore, this analysis would perform no additional work beyond the other 
two prongs—possession and authenticity. 
Under the possession prong,179 it is not difficult to see why the act of 
production in a possession-crime case will count as sufficiently testimonial 
because the act of entering a password communicates several incriminating 
facts.  First, it almost conclusively demonstrates that the suspect possessed 
the images.  Second, this fact, possession, is highly material because it is an 
element of some crimes, including possession of child pornography180 and 
receipt of such images.181  Similarly, his act of entering the password is 
probative to another fact:  knowledge.  The fact that the images appear on a 
device he is able to open increases the probability that he knowingly 
possessed the images—another element of certain crimes.182  Finally, at least 
with individual devices such as smartphones, the very fact that it is locked 
makes it more likely that whoever can open it is the only person who can do 
so.  The moment the suspect opens it, in this context, makes it more likely 
the child pornography is his and not someone else’s. 
The authentication prong provides the most support for the rule of 
particularity that this Article proposes, in part because it arises from the 
scientific nature of strong encryption, but also because the principles flow 
naturally from the ordinary nonencryption cases. 
The rules of evidence require that the prosecutor authenticate any files she 
introduces at trial,183 and the foregone conclusion doctrine requires that she 
be able to do so independent of the suspect’s act of production—in our case, 
entering the password.  In Greenfield, for example, the government 
subpoenaed foreign bank account statements from the defendant.184  If the 
 
 178. United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 43 (2000) (quoting Curcio v. United States, 
354 U.S. 118, 128 (1957)). 
 179. The test proposed in this Article is essentially the test for the possession prong; 
therefore this Article’s proposed framework is not a simplification of this concept, at least in 
cases where possession is at issue.  As noted above, in possession crimes, such as child 
pornography, courts always treat the act of production as sufficiently testimonial. See supra 
notes 102–03 and accompanying text.  As a result, in possession-crime cases, the foregone 
conclusion test become the sole test. 
 180. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 2252, 2252A (2012). 
 181. Id.; United States v. Benoit, 713 F.3d 1, 6–7 (10th Cir. 2013) (holding that possession 
is a lesser included offense of receipt of child pornography). 
 182. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2252, 2252A; cf. United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 
64, 68–79 (1994); United States v. Grauer, 701 F.3d 318, 324 (8th Cir. 2012) (holding that the 
wife’s testimony that the defendant alone used the laptop regularly was sufficient to establish 
that he knowingly possessed the child pornography on it). 
 183. E.g., FED. R. EVID. 901. 
 184. United States v. Greenfield, 831 F.3d 106, 112–13 (2d Cir. 2016). 
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defendant produced these statements in response to the subpoena, that act of 
producing them from his own files would authenticate them as his bank 
records.185  Therefore, the Second Circuit held that the government could not 
compel this production unless it had the means to show they were his bank 
records independently.186 
Normally, a prosecutor would subpoena a bank employee to review the 
records and authenticate them as those of the defendant, but in Greenfield, 
the foreign banks at issue refused to make any employee available to 
authenticate the bank records or provide the underlying account statements 
in the first place.187  As a result, the government could not authenticate the 
bank statements independently of the defendant’s act of production, and the 
government failed to meet the requirements of the foregone conclusion 
doctrine.188  The Fifth Amendment therefore protected Greenfield from 
having to produce those bank statements. 
When we apply these principles to encryption, we see that the government 
must show it can authenticate the files independently of the defendant’s act 
of entering the password.  That is, it must be able to show that the decrypted 
file it shows the jury came from the defendant’s hard drive and that it belongs 
to the defendant.189  In other words, it must show that the file in evidence 
matches the encrypted file that the police originally seized from the 
defendant. 
We can compare this situation to a party’s burden when presenting the 
translation of a document from a foreign language into English for the jury.  
The party must show that the English translation really is an accurate 
translation of the original document.  To do so, it must show that the person 
who performed the translation speaks both languages and that this person can 
affirm that the English version is indeed an accurate translation from the 
foreign language.190 
If we think of the computer forensic expert as the “translator” in the above 
cases, one might believe she could compare the decrypted file with the 
encrypted file and show, through some kind of math, that the one is a 
decryption of the other—just as a translator can compare the original Spanish 
version with its English translation.  But this belief is wrong.  The entire point 
of strong encryption systems is to prevent someone from comparing the 
digital files alone and showing they match.  Instead, a secure encryption 
system is defined to mean that given a particular decrypted file, any other file 
 
 185. Id. at 118. 
 186. Id. at 122. 
 187. Id. 
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 189. In this context, authenticate does not mean a showing that the image actually depicts 
a minor and that the other elements of child pornography are met.  Rather, authenticate here 
means that the document or image is what the government claims it to be:  an accurate 
decryption of the encrypted file seized from the defendant. 
 190. FED. R. EVID. 604 (“An interpreter must be qualified and must give an oath or 
affirmation to make a true translation.”); Kassim v. City of Schenectady, 415 F.3d 246, 251 
(2d Cir. 2005). 
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is just as likely to represent the encrypted version as the one presented.191  
Only the key, or the password leading to the key, can show that the two files 
match. 
Instead, the “translator” in this case is the defendant.  When the defendant 
enters his key, he translates the encrypted version to the decrypted version.  
But the Fifth Amendment prohibits the prosecutor from pointing to the fact 
that the defendant entered his key to decrypt the files; the foregone 
conclusion doctrine requires that the prosecutor authenticate the files 
independently of the defendant’s act of production.  The government cannot 
avoid this result by compelling the defendant to state his password and then 
having government agents enter it themselves.  This course would avoid the 
authentication problem, but it would amount to ordinary compulsion of oral 
testimony, which violates the Fifth Amendment.192 
Finally, immunity provides no solution here.  If we grant immunity to a 
defendant who then states his password to an agent, then Kastigar applies 
and the government cannot even use the contents of the files recovered.193  
Even if the government immunizes the suspect’s act of entering his 
password, it is still stuck because it will be unable to show that the decrypted 
version introduced at trial matches the encrypted version found on the 
defendant without introducing to the jury the fact that the defendant entered 
his password.  Because the fact of this action is precisely what the 
government has immunized, it therefore cannot use that act against him at 
trial. 
We can now show how the authentication prong boils down the rule of 
particularity proposed in this Article.  As described in this Part, the 
government cannot authenticate any files it obtains from a locked device by 
technological or mathematical measures; rather, it must rely on a human 
witness to authenticate it.  Such a witness might be a spouse or investigator 
who saw the image on the device.  If so, that person would testify in court 
that the image the prosecutor has shown to the jury matches the one the 
witness saw on the defendant’s device when it was not locked. 
In order to authenticate this information under the Federal Rules of 
Evidence, this witness must (1) have firsthand knowledge that the defendant 
possessed the image on the device,194 and (2) be able to describe it well 
enough to persuade a jury that the two images are the same.195  This test 
aligns with this Article’s rule of particularity.  If we assume the witness is 
working with law enforcement, then law enforcement will know the suspect 
 
 191. See generally JONATHAN KATZ & YEHUDA LINDELL, INTRODUCTION TO MODERN 
CRYPTOGRAPHY (2d ed. 2015) (discussing how strong encryption withstands known plaintext 
attacks and more determined ones as well). 
 192. See supra Part III.C. 
 193. See supra notes 142–43 and accompanying text. 
 194. See FED. R. EVID. 602 (requiring “personal knowledge”); id. r. 701(a) (requiring 
“witness’s perception” for lay opinions); id. r. 901(b)(1) (providing that a “witness with 
knowledge” may authenticate evidence). 
 195. Id. r. 901 (stating that testimony must be “sufficient to support a finding that the item 
is what the proponent claims it is”—in this case, the same as the one seen on the device). 
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possesses the file on the device and will be able to describe it with reasonable 
particularity.  The reasonable-particularity test closely parallels the federal 
evidentiary requirement that the testimony be sufficient to show the files are 
the same. 
B.  Application of the Rule of Particularity to Locked Devices 
We can now apply the rule of particularity to locked devices under the 
foregone conclusion test.  When the police arrest a person with a locked 
device, do they know whether he possesses certain documents that they can 
describe with reasonable particularity?  In some cases, they will not.  If the 
police arrest a person for drug dealing, they will have probable cause to 
believe there is some kind of evidence on his phone, but nothing in particular.  
They will not be able to describe particular messages, images, or 
spreadsheets. 
On the other hand, in many child pornography cases, the government will 
meet the test.  This follows because the government likely developed 
probable cause in the first place because an agent, spouse, or other individual 
saw a particular image on the defendant’s device,196 or the authorities may 
have forensic evidence that the defendant downloaded certain files, usually 
by comparing the hash value of the file downloaded with the hash value of 
known contraband images.197 
For example, in In re Boucher,198 police saw particular images on the 
defendant’s computer before he closed it.199  Thereafter, they could not 
access the computer files without a password.200  The grand jury demanded 
that he produce the unencrypted versions of the files on the hard drive.201 
The defendant argued that requiring him to produce the unencrypted 
versions would require an act of production which, itself, would be 
testimonial.202  The court disagreed and enforced the subpoena.203  It 
concluded that the government had satisfied the foregone conclusion doctrine 
because it could identify the documents sought with reasonable 
particularity—law enforcement had already seen them.204 
 
 196. See, e.g., In re Boucher, No. 2:06-mj-91, 2009 WL 424718, at *1–2 (D. Vt. Feb. 19, 
2009).  How particularly must this witness describe the image?  Courts can develop guidelines, 
but commonsense factors can be used to identify an image:  the setting and lighting of the 
image (indoors, outdoors), the apparent age of the child, the number of persons depicted, their 
clothes, hair color, and conduct. 
 197. Internet service providers regularly report when they detect contraband images 
crossing their networks, again based on hash values. See, e.g., United States v. Keith, 980 F. 
Supp. 2d 33, 36 (D. Mass. 2013).  Agents may have downloaded files from the defendant’s 
computer as part of a peer-to-peer sharing network. See, e.g., Hamilton v. State, 387 P.3d 903, 
905 (Okla. Crim. App. 2016). 
 198. No. 2:06-mj-91, 2009 WL 424718 (D. Vt. Feb. 19, 2009). 
 199. Id. at *2. 
 200. Law enforcement mirrored the defendant’s hard drive pursuant to a warrant but could 
not open the mirrored drive without a password; its entirety was encrypted. Id. 
 201. Id. 
 202. Id. at *3–4. 
 203. Id. 
 204. Id. at *4. 
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This is the right result, but the court went too far when it required that he 
produce all the documents on his hard drive.  After all, the government had 
not shown it knew the defendant possessed images beyond those 
identified.205 
C.  Logistics 
In most cases, if law enforcement wins, the suspect must enter his 
password to the device and walk away.206  Law enforcement agents gain 
access to and may search the entirety of the device.  But under the rule 
proposed in this Article, a court may compel a suspect to enter his password 
in order to produce only those files the government already knows he 
possesses and can describe with reasonable particularity. 
Several options present themselves to address how this would function in 
practice.  First, we could treat this as an ordinary document production.  Law 
enforcement will give the suspect the device under the supervision of 
counsel.  Agents will supply a list of documents to produce, ones they know 
the defendant possesses and can describe with reasonable particularity.  The 
suspect will enter his password to decrypt the device.  The suspect will either 
print the documents or, more likely, burn copies to a flash drive and supply 
that flash drive to law enforcement.  The defendant will then close the device 
and return it to law enforcement in its encrypted condition. 
If law enforcement can show that the suspect cannot be trusted, even with 
counsel, to carry out this task, it could ask the court to appoint a special 
master to oversee the process.  In cases in which the defendant continues to 
insist, for example, that the requested files are not on the drive, the special 
master could search the drive herself for the itemized files.  This latter 
solution resembles protocol suggested by the Ninth Circuit for conducting 
electronic searches with Fourth Amendment limits in mind.207 
D.  Mistaken Application of the Foregone Conclusion Doctrine 
Some courts have misapplied the foregone conclusion doctrine by asking 
whether it is a foregone conclusion that the suspect knows his own 
password.208  Since this is nearly always true, such a misapplication would 
swallow the rule and allow the government to compel the entry of a password 
in any case in which law enforcement can show the defendant owns the 
 
 205. Id. at *1–2. 
 206. See, e.g., supra note 19 and accompanying text. 
 207. See United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc., 621 F.3d 1162, 1180 (9th Cir. 
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device.  At least one court has applied the doctrine to oral disclosures of 
passwords.209 
It is a mistake to apply the foregone conclusion doctrine to the oral 
disclosure of a password.  The Supreme Court has never hinted that the 
foregone conclusion test applies to oral testimony—it applies only to an act, 
namely, the act of producing documents.210  The entire premise of Fisher 
says that the compelled production of documents does not initially violate the 
Fifth Amendment because the statements in those documents are preexisting 
and were created in a written form voluntarily.211  Compelling a person to 
state her password does not compel production of existing documents but 
compels disclosure of what is in her mind. 
But when we consider an order to compel a person to enter her password, 
can we apply the foregone conclusion doctrine to the password only and ask 
whether the government can show that it knows the defendant knows her own 
password?  The Third Circuit and other courts hint that we can.212  But this 
view also misconstrues the doctrine. 
The foregone conclusion doctrine assesses whether the act of production 
communicates (new) facts to the government concerning the existence, 
possession, or authenticity of documents.  We can only assess the facts 
communicated about these documents with reference to the content of the 
documents.  True, the contents of the documents are not protected, but we 
need those contents to identify the documents.  For the government to say a 
suspect possesses a certain bank statement, it must describe the bank 
statement with reasonable particularity to make clear it is that exact bank 
statement the suspect possesses and not another statement or document 
entirely.  The government likely must name the bank, the account, and the 
month.  Otherwise, it is not a foregone conclusion that that document exists, 
is possessed by the suspect, and is authentic.213 
Applied to passwords, the facts communicated by entering the password 
are not simply that the person knows the password but also that the 
documents revealed by decryption exist,214 are possessed by the defendant, 
and are authentic.  In seeking to meet the foregone conclusion test, the 
government must reference the contents of the documents and not simply the 
password—that is, it must show it knows that the person possesses the 
documents.  If the government cannot identify any documents on the device, 
the suspect’s compelled act—entering the password—will communicate to 
 
 209. Stahl, 206 So.3d at 134.  The court spoke of requiring the defendant to “provide” the 
password, though it also spoke of requiring him to “produce” it. Id. at 128.  While not clear, 
the court appears to envision compelling the defendant to state the password and not simply 
to enter it. 
 210. See Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 411 (1976). 
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the government the person’s possession of the documents and their 
authenticity, facts the government did not know previously. 
We may illustrate the mistake by remembering precisely how the analogy 
to the act of production works.  The act of entering the password is analogous 
to the act of physically handing over documents in the physical world.  In 
neither instance does the foregone conclusion doctrine apply solely to that 
act; rather, it applies to the papers produced.  In the physical world, the court 
asks whether it is a foregone conclusion that the papers produced exist and 
are in the defendant’s possession, not whether the defendant is physically 
capable of producing the documents. 
In the password context, the password is not being produced.  Indeed, our 
entire premise rests upon the fact that the password is never produced to 
anyone and we are treating entering the password as an act.  Instead, the act 
of entering the password, like the act of physically handing over documents, 
produces the underlying documents on the device.  We must therefore ask, 
in both cases, whether it is a foregone conclusion that those documents on 
the device exist. 
Some courts insist that if we know the person possesses the device, it is a 
foregone conclusion that the person possesses the items on the device, 
whatever they turn out to be.215  But the government must show before the 
production that the person possesses the particular documents because, 
otherwise, it is the very production that shows possession.  To return to the 
physical world, the government could subpoena all the documents a person 
possesses in his home.  Upon production, it would be a foregone conclusion 
that the suspect possessed any documents he happened to produce because 
they all came from his home.  But a court would never apply the foregone 
conclusion doctrine in this manner because the government must establish, 
before and independent of production, that the defendant possesses particular 
documents. 
Applying the foregone conclusion doctrine to the password also runs afoul 
of the very principle of Fisher.  In Fisher, the Court refused to provide Fifth 
Amendment protection to the content of documents because they already 
exist; when the person created them at some earlier date, they did so 
voluntarily and not under government compulsion.216  But the password is 
not a preexisting document in this scenario; rather, it resides solely in the 
suspect’s mind.  To treat the password as the thing produced would mean it 
is the testimony compelled and it would therefore enjoy full Fifth 
Amendment protection just like any other compelled oral statement. 
E.  Nonpossessory Crimes 
In some cases, the government will not use any file recovered from the 
suspect’s device at trial.  Rather, it will use information recovered from the 
device to locate other evidence to use at trial.  It might use the defendant’s 
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bank statements, for example, to get the original checks that represent the 
actual income.  In these cases, possession and authenticity play a far smaller 
role.  The prosecutor will never need to show the defendant possessed this 
bank statement or authenticate it at trial. 
Courts have ruled inconsistently in this area of the law.  The Court in 
United States v. Hubbell217 treated these as existence cases.218  It found the 
production there sufficiently testimonial because the defendant had made 
“extensive use of the contents of his mind” in producing the documents.219  
But Hubbell did not say this test was a required showing, rather that it 
sufficed to show the production was testimonial.220 
Indeed, several leading lower court decisions seem to have treated even 
existence cases as resting entirely on the foregone conclusion test, largely 
skipping any measure of whether the production was sufficiently testimonial 
because it made extensive use of the mind.221  One such leading case is 
United States v. Ponds.222  There, the government sought documents to use 
the information as leads and would not introduce the documents at trial.  
Possession and authenticity thus seem far less relevant.  Nevertheless, the 
D.C. Circuit did not appear to require the defendant to show he made 
extensive use of the contents of his mind in responding to the subpoena.223  
Rather, it appeared to jump straight to the foregone conclusion test and held 
that the government had failed to show it knew of the documents in advance 
and could describe them with reasonable particularity.224  The Second Circuit 
in Greenfield took a similar approach.225 
If we apply these cases to passwords, we can come to one of two 
conclusions.  If we require evidence that the defendant made extensive use 
of the contents of his mind, entering a password does not cross that threshold; 
we never reach the foregone conclusion test, and thus the government is 
permitted to compel the password.  But if we follow many lower court 
decisions and jump straight to the foregone conclusion test—in other words, 
applying this Article’s rule of particularity—the government will have to 
demonstrate it knows of the documents and can describe them.  Only then 
will we allow compulsion.  This Article chooses the second course and 
proposes requiring the rule of particularity even for existence cases, not based 
upon the act-of-production cases themselves, but rather the broader Fourth 
and Fifth Amendment principles discussed in Part V below. 
 
 217. 530 U.S. 27 (2000). 
 218. Id. at 42–44. 
 219. Id. at 43 (quoting Curcio v. United States, 354 U.S. 118, 128 (1957)). 
 220. Id. at 41. 
 221. See id.; United States v. Ponds, 454 F.3d 313, 318–20 (D.C. Cir. 2006). 
 222. 454 F.3d 313 (2006). 
 223. Id. at 324. 
 224. Id. 
 225. See generally United States v. Greenfield, 831 F.3d 106 (2d Cir. 2016). 
2018] UNLOCKING THE FIFTH AMENDMENT 239 
F.  Bitcoin and Other Cryptocurrency 
These principles will apply to cases outside the realm of contraband 
images, including Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies, but in novel ways.  A 
person who owns or possesses Bitcoin controls it with a long, complex 
encryption key.226  Often, they will not memorize the key itself but encrypt 
the key on a flash drive they can open with a shorter password or passphrase 
that they have memorized.227  Or they will outsource the responsibility to 
hold onto the keys to an institution such as Coinbase and use a password to 
access their Coinbase account.228 
Whether the government can compel a person to disclose the password that 
would lead to the longer Bitcoin key depends on why the government wants 
the information.  If the person has already been convicted and the government 
seeks forfeiture of the Bitcoin as value, then it can likely compel the 
password because it will not be used as evidence at trial to convict.  The 
“incrimination” part of the Fifth Amendment is missing.  But if the 
government seeks the key to link the defendant to criminal proceeds at trial, 
then this case resembles the cases above.  And as above, if law enforcement 
simply sought to compel the suspect to orally (or in writing) disclose the 
password that would allow them access to the underlying encryption key for 
the Bitcoin, this compulsion would violate the Fifth Amendment directly. 
Even if law enforcement officers compel a person merely to enter her 
password into a Bitcoin wallet, unlocking, in turn, the longer Bitcoin key, the 
government might fail our rule of particularity.  After all, the government 
seeks to link the defendant to the Bitcoin value, but it can only do so if the 
defendant enters her password and it does, in fact, unlock a key associated 
with that particular Bitcoin.  This presents precisely the authentication 
problem raised above with possession-crime cases:  the government will 
never be able to link the defendant to the Bitcoin without providing the jury 
with evidence of the fact that the defendant entered his wallet password, and 
the foregone conclusion doctrine forbids this. 
G.  Objections or Other Views 
Prosecutors may object that the rule proposed in this Article will prevent 
them from charging the appropriate offenses based on the defendant’s entire 
conduct or that sentencing judges will lack all the information concerning the 
defendant.  For example, in a case involving child pornography, the United 
States Sentencing Guidelines add points for the number of images.229  If we 
limit the government to obtaining only those images it already knows the 
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defendant possesses, we may undercount by hundreds or thousands of images 
and put the defendant in a sentencing range two, three, four, or five points 
too low.  Sentences in fraud cases similarly hinge on the loss; if the 
government cannot obtain all documents, it may fail to account for the 
entirety of the loss the defendant caused. 
This objection has great merit.  We cannot catch every criminal.  For those 
we do catch, however, there is a sense that we should charge and sentence 
them according to their actual culpability.230  On the other hand, particularly 
in federal cases, the fact of a conviction for possession of child pornography 
or fraud will often adequately condemn the defendant.  In addition, the 
difference in sentences will not actually amount to a significant difference, 
and judges have the discretion to depart from the sentencing guidelines.231 
More importantly, 97 percent of federal cases reach resolution through a 
plea.232  As part of a plea, the government can certainly insist that the 
defendant waive his Fifth Amendment protection to his device, just as he 
must waive his Fifth Amendment right to enter the guilty plea itself.  As a 
practical matter, the government will retain significant leverage to obtain the 
contents of the device once it has secured at least one image. 
Finally, Fifth Amendment protections always bring costs, not only in 
whether the government can convict a person at all, but which counts it can 
bring and how heavy a sentence it can exact.  Existing act-of-production 
doctrine cases impose this same rule in all criminal cases involving 
subpoenas of a suspect or defendant for her documents, and we tolerate this 
limit in those cases well enough. 
One important subset of criminal investigations involves emergencies.  A 
suspect may have left a kidnapped victim alive somewhere, and law 
enforcement will want to compel the person to disclose that location so they 
can go save her.  Or, in the context of smartphones, an iPhone may contain 
the secret code to disarm a nuclear bomb about to detonate in a major city.  
Surely, one would argue, agents or courts can compel a suspect to enter her 
password to the device and allow law enforcement further access to disarm 
the bomb. 
Of course, the answer is yes.  A court can immunize the suspect and 
compel her to decrypt the drive containing the secret code, and thereby 
disarm the bomb and save the world.233  Or law enforcement itself can use 
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any lawful means of compulsion.  But the government cannot then use that 
evidence against the suspect in a subsequent criminal trial.234  In other words, 
the Fifth Amendment presents no obstacle to otherwise lawful compulsion in 
the face of an emergency to stop the emergency.  But once the emergency 
has been averted, we can no longer point to the emergency as a justification 
to compel a person to testify against herself at trial.  Just as in any other case, 
serious or minor, the Fifth Amendment protects such defendants and 
mandates that, at trial, such evidence is off limits. 
Another objection arises when we compare entering a passcode with 
opening a phone with a thumbprint or facial recognition.  Many phones open 
with a thumbprint or facial recognition.235  These technologies present a 
further challenge.  Courts have held that thumbprints enjoy no Fifth 
Amendment protection because they are essentially seizures:  law 
enforcement can obtain a warrant and physically force a person’s thumb onto 
the device.236 
These courts are right.  Compelling a thumbprint closely resembles the 
physical characteristic cases such as Holt and may therefore be resolved in 
the government’s favor on this basis.237  In addition, unlike entering a 
password, placing a thumb on a device involves no statement or language-
like cognition at all, not even as much as remembering and entering a 
passcode or password.238  But the objection asks why should the result differ 
so much between compelling a password versus compelling a thumbprint.  
The answer may not be entirely satisfying, but it depends upon how the case 
law ends up dividing between the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, between 
the taking of evidence versus requiring the suspect to produce it. 
One final practical objection might run as follows:  many investigations 
into businesses, whether criminal or civil, depend upon electronic documents 
that will likely be stored on locked, encrypted devices.  Investigations into 
tax fraud, stock fraud, pollution, and many regulatory offenses involve 
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millions of documents.  The simple approach is that the Fifth Amendment 
does not protect business entities at all.239  The harder question will arise 
when the individual who possesses the password claims a personal privilege 
even in producing the password (which will show she has access to and 
knowledge of at least some of the documents).  This problem arises already 
in many corporate contexts,240 though encryption may magnify them.  
However, most businesses will give many key employees the password, and 
often nonbusiness IT personnel may enjoy access that will not be 
incriminating. 
V.  A PRACTICAL SETTLEMENT:  HARMONIZING 
THE FOURTH AND FIFTH AMENDMENTS 
This Part steps back to show how a more theoretical view of both the 
Fourth and Fifth Amendments lends support to this rule of particularity, 
especially in this hybrid situation where encrypted devices necessarily bring 
the two amendments into play. 
A.  Fifth Amendment Theory 
Scholars have struggled to identify a single principle or collection of 
principles that explain current doctrine or even the value of the Fifth 
Amendment itself.241  David Dolinko has comprehensively compassed the 
various proposed justifications for the Fifth Amendment, dividing them 
roughly into (1) those that draw upon the rights of the individual to dignity 
or privacy, and (2) those that focus on promoting the adversarial system.242  
Taken in isolation, each justification falls short.  For example, the Supreme 
Court once insisted that the Fifth Amendment protects privacy,243 but this is 
not quite true because the government can always provide a suspect or 
witness with immunity and compel disclosure of the same information, no 
matter how private.244 
On the other hand, Professor Dolinko concedes that the Fifth Amendment 
plays an important role in our existing criminal justice system since so much 
of that system has grown up around its protections.245  We can remove the 
right against self-incrimination no more safely than a Jenga plank from its 
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precarious tower.  Similarly, Dolinko has shown how the Fifth Amendment 
sometimes takes up the slack when other protections fail.  He points to the 
McCarthy-era hearings in which those subpoenaed pleaded the Fifth 
Amendment to protect values largely falling under the First Amendment.246  
Courts had rejected a First Amendment defense, leaving the Fifth 
Amendment to fill in the void.247 
Similarly, in this context, the Fifth Amendment may not protect privacy 
directly.  Nevertheless, in our hybrid situation of encrypted devices where 
the Fifth Amendment already applies to some extent along with the Fourth 
Amendment, we may view the Fifth Amendment as protecting the privacy of 
papers that current Fourth Amendment case law has wrongly failed to 
protect.248  Or, put another way, we can simply say that the Fifth Amendment 
protection for passwords furthers Fourth Amendment goals of privacy. 
The second justification that Dolinko identifies, and critiques, is that the 
Fifth Amendment enhances an adversarial as opposed to an inquisitorial 
method of criminal investigation.249  The Court regularly notes that the 
government must “shoulder the entire load” in its “contest with the 
individual.”250  It may not take shortcuts by compelling confessions, but 
rather it must build the case entirely on its own.  Despite criticism, both courts 
and scholars regularly rely upon an adversarial model to some extent in 
interpreting the Fifth Amendment.251  Indeed, hundreds of courts252 have 
quoted approvingly the Supreme Court’s premise that the government must 
“shoulder the entire load”—including several state supreme courts just in the 
last two years.253  And while the Supreme Court has limited the personal-
dignity rationale for the Fifth Amendment, it has pointed to “preventing 
government overreach[]” as a central principle.254  On “anyone’s view,” 
according to the Court, this principle against government overreach “lies at 
the core of the Clause’s purposes.”255  Those who critique the notion that the 
Fifth Amendment requires the government to “shoulder the entire load” have 
a point, but those critics reject any adversarial principle simply because the 
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most extreme version—“the entire load”—makes little sense.256  In other 
words, we may safely posit that the Fifth Amendment furthers the adversarial 
nature of our system—the question is, to what extent? 
In identifying the appropriate level of protection the Fifth Amendment 
affords in promoting an adversarial system, we can start with a hypothetical 
range.  At one extreme, the Fifth Amendment prohibits the government from 
enlisting any assistance whatsoever from the defendant, which would include 
a prohibition on compelled entering of a password, of course.  At the other 
extreme, the government can compel any assistance that does not involve 
literal oral or written testimony.  This view would allow the government to 
compel the act of entering a password since that act likely does not involve 
literal oral or written testimony. 
The chief proponent of the no-assistance camp is Professor Nagareda.  His 
originalist work shows that the framers intended the Fifth Amendment to 
prohibit the government from compelling a defendant to “furnish” evidence 
against himself; that is what they meant by “witness.”257  In his view, Fisher 
is simply wrong.258  When the government subpoenas documents, it compels 
the defendant to assist the prosecution by furnishing evidence against 
himself, and this conduct violates the language, “to be a witness against 
himself.”259  But Nagareda notes that the Fourth Amendment always permits, 
as a backup, the government’s power to merely seize any evidence, including 
documents.260  In his view, the Fifth Amendment draws a line not at 
testimony but at compelled assistance.  The government may take evidence 
with a warrant, but not compel the defendant to furnish it. 
At the other end of the spectrum, we might simply say the Fifth 
Amendment protects “testimony” only.  That is, testimony in its 
straightforward core meaning:  communication through speech.  A “witness,” 
after all, recounts what she observed through language.  The text supports 
this view, of course.  The Court implicitly supported this view in Fisher by 
rejecting, at least initially, protection for a person compelled to produce 
documents.261  The Fifth Amendment, under this second account, would not 
prohibit any other type of compelled assistance and would not, therefore, 
enforce the adversary system beyond this one tactic. 
We can reject both extremes, for different reasons, before arriving at our 
middle path.  As for Nagareda’s argument, the first answer is that the Fifth 
Amendment does not say “furnish evidence”; rather, it says, “be a 
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witness.”262  This is the main reason Fisher rejected Fifth Amendment 
protections for preexisting documents.263  Plus, even Nagareda concedes the 
Fifth Amendment allows the government to compel the defendant’s 
assistance in many ways, including exhibiting physical characteristics.264 
Finally, we may reject Nagareda’s view in our particular, hybrid situation 
of encrypted devices.  Nagareda’s view depends in part on the premise that 
the government always enjoys, as a backup to compelling assistance from the 
defendant, the power, with a warrant, to unilaterally seize evidence.  But 
encrypted devices defeat this backup method:  if law enforcement cannot 
access the device, it cannot obtain even those documents it can identify with 
a warrant. 
We can also reject the other extreme—that the Fifth Amendment protects 
only testimony that resembles speech, such as oral statements, or compelled 
written statements.  We must do so because Fisher and Hubbell have 
extended testimony and “witness” beyond these core examples with the act-
of-production doctrine.265  This doctrine recognizes the act of producing 
documents, or the act of entering a password, as testimony even though the 
person performing the act does not communicate through language.  Indeed, 
the person producing the documents does not intend the act to be 
communicative at all. 
In between these theories, this Article’s rule of particularity allows some 
compelled assistance, such as decrypting those files the government can 
identify, but no more.  If our test is simply a “fair” adversarial system, we 
might say this balance strikes many of us as fair.  The government gets access 
to the documents it can identify in advance, but no more.  Suspects must 
assist in some small measure in their own prosecution but only by producing 
documents that the government has identified.  This assistance—
surrendering documents the government has identified—resembles 
disclosing a physical characteristic, such as allowing a blood draw in a drunk 
driving case or producing a voice or handwriting exemplar, more than it does 
ordinary testimony. 
This rule also furthers a more concrete principle underlying the adversarial 
model:  antifishing.  This principle draws upon both the Fourth and Fifth 
Amendments.  Therefore, it shows that they need not stand marshalled as 
opposing forces:  the Fourth grants the government what the Fifth denies.  
Instead, this antifishing principle harmonizes and unites the Fourth and Fifth 
Amendments around this Article’s rule of particularity that law enforcement 
obtains only those documents it can identify with particularity in advance. 
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Two related scenarios can describe the concept of a fishing expedition.  In 
the first, the government has no probable cause or suspicion to believe a 
given person has committed any crime; nevertheless, law enforcement agents 
attempt to gather evidence from the suspect in an effort to find one.  The 
court in Hubbell viewed the special prosecutor’s investigation in this light 
and dubbed it the “quintessential fishing expedition.”266  In the second 
scenario, the government has probable cause for one crime but demands from 
the suspect papers and other evidence to look for other, unrelated crimes. 
This value against fishing expeditions captures both some notion of prior 
suspicion, such as probable cause, to justify the defendant’s assistance and 
some notion as to scope regarding that assistance.  The rule of particularity 
for passwords limiting agents to those documents it can identify answers both 
concerns. 
The Fifth Amendment protects this antifishing principle chiefly in white 
collar criminal investigations involving large numbers of documents, often 
personal financial papers.  Most recently in Hubbell, the court found that the 
government’s subpoena violated the Fifth Amendment because it demanded 
that the defendant review his financial records and other papers for those 
responsive to several broad subpoena categories.267  This process of 
reviewing, separating, organizing, and producing required the defendant use 
(and in some sense reveal) the contents of his mind in ways that amounted to 
Fifth Amendment testimony.268 
But with this account of Hubbell, a new problem arises:  any subpoena 
requires the defendant to use his mind in finding, organizing, and producing 
responsive documents.  Yet Hubbell does not invalidate all subpoenas or 
overrule Fisher.  We must therefore discern that the Hubbell subpoena 
crossed the line into compelled testimony due to its scope:  the degree to 
which it enlisted the defendant’s assistance.  In other words, the subpoena 
went beyond mere surrender of documents because it was the “quintessential 
fishing expedition.”269 
Indeed, the Supreme Court has had several occasions to find in the Fifth 
Amendment a general principle against fishing expeditions.270  Older 
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precedents such as Boyd draw a closer connection between papers and self-
incrimination in ways that echo this principle against government 
rummaging through papers in search of evidence of a crime.271 
The Fourth Amendment also protects against fishing expeditions272 far 
more explicitly than the Fifth.  It guards against unreasonable searches and 
general warrants, two requirements that arose in part out of English 
precedents disapproving broad searches and seizures of a person’s personal 
papers for use in a criminal case.273  One influential English pamphlet 
excoriating such searches and seizures of papers used the term “fishing” to 
describe the potential government practice of scouring a person’s papers to 
discover new crimes and linked this protection to the right against self-
incrimination.274  Some scholars point to this and other English pamphlets of 
the 1760s and 1770s as influencing the adoption of the search and seizure 
provisions of the early state constitutions, as well as that of the Fourth 
Amendment.275 
Disapproval of fishing expeditions during the founding era appears to have 
extended to civil cases, where courts sometimes rejected any paper discovery 
if not supported by some independent facts justifying the discovery.  One 
New York court in 1800 referred to such a bill as a “mere fishing bill” and 
cited authorities from England that suggest the term had already become 
commonplace.276  Courts in the United States in the late nineteenth century 
continued to use the term “fishing expedition” to describe civil discovery 
practices that also required the opposing party to produce all their books and 
records.277  At the time, the rule limited a party to discovery of only a narrow 
class of documents that they could identify and demonstrate were material.  
Although in civil contexts, courts pointed to the preference for adversarial 
rather than inquisitorial methods in limiting paper discovery.278 
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The Fourth Amendment concern with broad paper searches and seizures 
rests upon values beyond fishing expeditions for new crimes; it relies as well 
on protecting privacy and security.  Both the reasonableness clause and the 
warrant clause protect privacy by limiting searches and seizures to only those 
items that can be listed with particularity in the warrant.279  This requirement 
will prevent officers from seizing or searching many unrelated items and 
therefore protect privacy.  In the context of papers, this means it should 
prevent officers and other government officials from reading papers 
unrelated to the investigation that might contain personal or private 
information, such as letters, diaries, and family photos.  A rule for encrypted 
devices that requires agents to list in advance with reasonable particularity 
the documents or files that they already know the defendant possesses will 
certainly further this goal better than current Fourth Amendment case law.280 
The proposed rule of particularity also furthers the Fourth Amendment 
goal of security.  That is, it furthers a type of Fourth Amendment security 
beyond mere privacy-as-secrecy from prying government eyes.  It will assure 
a suspect that law enforcement limits its search to documents relevant to the 
crime by limiting it to those documents.  The suspect will not have to worry 
that law enforcement will, having gained access to the device, scour its 
entirety looking at unrelated photos and videos, even if only out of curiosity.  
Instead, the suspect will know precisely which files the government has 
access to.  It will similarly provide the suspect with an accounting of the files 
accessed.  This will both give the suspect control and help make the people 
“secure in their . . . papers.”281 
Some scholars, recognizing the need for balance in the adversarial system 
under the Fifth Amendment, have argued for a different result from my 
proposal.  Dan Terzian, for example, has argued that allowing any Fifth 
Amendment protection for a password in the face of a warrant would impose 
too high a burden to law enforcement, contending that the Fifth Amendment 
must yield.282  But his argument seems to rely upon an all-or-nothing 
approach:  either the person decrypts the entire device or none of it.  If those 
are the only two options, one understands why law enforcement should 
obtain access.  But my rule sidesteps the all-or-nothing approach, allowing 
law enforcement access to only those files it can identify with reasonable 
particularity.  That represents a true balance of interests. 
B.  Fourth Amendment Theory 
Law enforcement agents often reject any balance between the Fourth and 
Fifth Amendment and claim that they are entitled to everything.  In their 
view, the Fourth Amendment already contains the relevant balance between 
privacy and disclosure:  a warrant based upon probable cause.283  If the 
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government has successfully seized the media pursuant to such a warrant, 
affording it the right to search that media, then it is entitled to those 
documents.  Compelling a person to enter a password follows as an adjunct 
to executing the warrant.284 
In response to this maximalist position, we may first point out that the Fifth 
Amendment enjoys equal constitutional status and, at the very least, must be 
taken into account.  The government often enjoys the legal right or power to 
search a place or item that it cannot locate because of the Fifth Amendment.  
For example, the police cannot compel a suspect to disclose the location of a 
body so that the government may search for it, or seize it, even if the 
government has obtained a warrant to search for or seize the body.285  It also 
cannot compel a person to disclose the location of bank accounts,286 safes, or 
other containers even if the government otherwise has probable cause and a 
warrant to search them.  A warrant cannot change physics; a warrant that 
provides a legal right cannot provide a physical ability to access that 
evidence.287 
But the government’s argument runs into a far more serious objection.  As 
originally understood, the Fourth Amendment likely banned any search and 
seizure of personal papers in a criminal case.288  This principle rested in part 
on the notion that agents could, in theory, seize particular incriminating 
documents, but they could not look through innocent documents to find 
them.289  If the Fourth Amendment banned paper searches in criminal cases, 
then the government could not seize a person’s electronic device at all, much 
less compel a person to open it.  Although the Fourth Amendment no longer 
entirely bans such searches and seizures, law enforcement still cannot point 
to the Fourth Amendment to show that it supplies the relevant balance for 
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encrypted devices because the Court has never answered that question, and 
the framers would have disallowed any such seizure and search.  As Laura 
Donohue put it: 
This point is worth emphasizing in the contemporary environment, not least 
because the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, in the context 
of the encryption debate, has taken to repeating a falsehood:  that, with the 
appropriate process, the government has always had access to what people 
think, say, and write.  It has not.  For nearly two hundred years, the 
government could not obtain private papers—even with a warrant—when 
they were to be used as evidence of criminal activity.290 
Of course, we have long departed from the view that papers are absolutely 
protected, whether under the Fourth or Fifth Amendment.  The entire 
regulatory state would collapse without the government power to review 
papers,291 as would most white-collar criminal prosecutions.  But, even once 
we acknowledge the right of the government to seize and search papers 
pursuant to a warrant, we can impose limits consistent with the original 
prohibition and the modern view of the particularity requirement of the 
warrant clause, now made relevant to papers. 
If the reasonableness clause prohibited the seizure of papers in part 
because agents cannot look through innocent papers to find the incriminating 
ones,292 this rule of particularity answers this precise objection.  The 
government may compel an individual to decrypt only those documents it 
can already identify, and it will not see any innocent documents. 
CONCLUSION 
Passwords, passcodes, and passphrases have increasingly become the 
personal key to our entire digital and online lives.  It may seem a little thing, 
a four- or six-digit passcode, but this slender thread unlocks the entirety of a 
person’s life—it is the corpus callosum between our minds and our vast 
repositories of personal information.  This Article argues that passwords 
must therefore enjoy at least some robust Fifth Amendment protections—but 
how much?  When can law enforcement, armed with a warrant, compel a 
person to enter her password and unlock her device, decrypt her files, and 
make accessible her entire digital life? 
In answering this question, this Article notes a seldom-considered 
development:  encrypted devices seized by law enforcement with a search 
warrant present a hybrid case that brings into play both the Fourth and Fifth 
Amendments.  While the last 150 years have seen the Supreme Court striving 
to separate these two amendments into discrete territories, the encrypted 
device forces us to reunite them.  With this overlap, we can either set them 
against each other or try to harmonize them.  This Article tries to harmonize 
them and draw upon their common values to create a middle ground. 
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In particular, this Article proposes a rule of particularity:  when law 
enforcement agents have a warrant to search a locked, encrypted device, they 
can compel the suspect to enter her password to decrypt only those files that 
agents (1) know she possesses, and (2) can describe with reasonable 
particularity.  This rule follows from a careful and technical consideration of 
the Supreme Court’s act-of-production doctrine and its foregone conclusion 
test.  This rule of particularity shows how lower courts have gone astray in 
applying this rule to passwords:  even if agents have succeeded in identifying 
some files or documents, that does not entitle them to have the entire device 
unlocked for their perusal. 
This rule of particularity answers the bigger, theoretical question of how 
we can harmonize the Fourth and Fifth Amendments.  First, it considers 
deficiencies in current lower court Fourth Amendment case law that permit 
agents, armed with a warrant, to search every file, every folder, and every 
deleted document, with the most sophisticated forensic software.  At least 
when a person has a passcode, the new rule limits them to those specific 
documents, if any, that gave rise to probable cause in the first place.  Second, 
my rule of particularity furthers a key goal of both amendments:  a principle 
against government fishing expeditions in which agents conduct vast, 
exploratory searches for unsuspected, new crimes against suspects or even 
nonsuspects. 
As encryption spreads to all digital information, whether communications 
over the internet or data at rest on our devices, passwords will play an 
increasingly critical role in protecting our data, but it will also present an 
increasing obstacle to legitimate law enforcement needs.  End-to-end 
encryption of communications, including emails and messages as well as 
internet browsing, means law enforcement will have to obtain data not from 
providers in transit but from individuals from their devices, cloud backups, 
or online accounts.  Data in flight will become data at rest.  This rule balances 
these concerns in ways that should help us navigate these impending battles. 
